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Abstract 
Positive reappraisal, a type of emotion regulation that involves cognitively 
reframing negative information in a positive light, has been shown to promote resilience 
in stressed individuals (i.e., it decreases depression and enhances well-being). The ability 
to use positive reappraisal (PRA) varies widely across individuals, raising the question of 
which cognitive functions might support this ability. Only a few studies have investigated 
this question, and they have not yet examined the relationships between PRA and 
executive functions that involve emotional materials (“valence-specific executive 
functions;” EF). The first part of the present study examined the relationships between 
PRA and two types of valence-specific EF theorized to be involved in PRA: inhibition of 
negative information and working memory for positive information. A community 
sample of 250 men and women (age 18 to 72 years) completed a PRA task and several 
valence-specific EF tasks. Results indicated no associations between PRA and valence-
specific EF. To take a step further, the second part of the study investigated whether age 
moderated the relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF. Previous studies have 
documented decline in cognitive function but well-preserved emotional function in old 
age. This raises the question of whether the relationships between PRA and valence-
specific EF change as a function of age. Regression analyses indicated an interaction 
between age and inhibition of negative information, such that older adults with better 
inhibition of negative information demonstrated higher PRA, whereas younger adults 
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with better inhibition of negative information showed lower PRA. These results have 
important implications for understanding how valence-specific EF supports PRA in 
adulthood. Potential explanations, methodological and theoretical implications, and 
future directions are discussed. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Emotion regulation serves a crucial role in psychological well-being (John & 
Gross, 2004). Specifically, emotion regulation is important when individuals undergo 
negative or stressful events. Emotion regulation “refers to the processes by which we 
influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and 
express them” (Gross, 2002, p. 282). For example, when experiencing a stressful life 
event such as writing a dissertation, to avoid overwhelming anxiety, the person can tell 
him or herself that the research topic is very interesting and the work is right on schedule, 
so there is no need to be anxious. In addition, the person can start exercising and 
meditating regularly and stick to a set schedule to work on the dissertation. Given that 
emotion regulation is essential for psychological well-being, the impairment of emotion 
regulation is closely related to various types of psychopathology, such as depression and 
anxiety (Gross & Muñoz, 1995). 
Reappraisal   
Reappraisal, a cognitive reframing strategy to change initial emotional responses, 
is one of the most commonly used emotion regulation strategies. More specifically, 
reappraisal involves cognitively reframing the appraisal of emotional stimuli. Other 
commonly used strategies include suppression (Gross & John, 2003) and distraction 
(McRae et al., 2010). Reappraisal has been demonstrated as an effective way to regulate 
emotions, in terms of subjective feelings and peripheral physiological response 
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(sympathetic activation). For example, individuals who use reappraisal to down-regulate 
the negative emotions elicited by a negative film, reported a greater decrease in 
subjective feelings of negative emotions coupled with less sympathetic activation 
compared to individuals who use suppression to regulate emotions (Gross, 1998; Gross, 
2002; Gross & John, 2003; Hofmann, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009).  
In addition to its effectiveness in regulating emotions, reappraisal has several 
other advantages. First, reappraisal has been documented to preserve better cognitive 
performance than suppression. One important difference between reappraisal and 
suppression is the amount of regulatory effort that’s required in the process. Suppression 
involves continual self-monitoring and self-correction to conceal one’s feelings. It 
demands a great deal of cognitive resources and thus is relatively taxing (Richards, 
Butler, & Gross, 2003). In contrast, because reappraisal intervenes in the emotional 
process before emotions become full-fledged (Gross, 1998), the subsequent regulatory 
effort for reappraisal becomes less burdensome (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003), 
and thus mental resources can be devoted to tasks that happen simultaneously with or 
immediately after the reappraisal. This explains why people who use reappraisal while 
performing cognitive tasks exhibit better performance than people who use suppression. 
As an illustration, in a study during which individuals’ memory performance was tested 
after participating in an emotion regulation task (instructed to suppress or reappraise 
while watching emotion-eliciting slides), reappraisers showed better memory regarding 
the information about the character in the slide than suppressors (Richards & Gross, 
2000, study 2). Memory advantages for reappraisers versus suppressors were also 
replicated in a conversational context where a dating couple discussed relationship issues; 
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reappraisers reported a greater number of immediate recalls of the conversation than 
suppressors (Richards et al., 2003).  
Second, reappraisal has important positive implications for individuals’ social 
outcomes: Reappraisal increases the quality of social interaction and social intimacy in 
interpersonal relationships, relative to suppression. One potential mechanism that leads 
reappraisers and suppressers to diverge on social outcomes is the differential cognitive 
demand involved in the regulatory process (Butler et al., 2003). The high cognitive 
demand in suppression distracts individuals from the conversation and subsequently 
impedes individuals from responding to their conversation partner. In addition to less 
responsiveness, suppressing emotional expression disrupts the interactive process of 
communicating emotions and feelings, which decreases social intimacy in interpersonal 
relationships. In contrast, the lower cognitive demand allows reappraisers to respond 
more freely and frequently to their conversation partners (Butler et al., 2003). They are 
also more willing to share emotions openly with others (Gross & John, 2003, study 4). In 
turn, the conversation partners of reappraisers reported a higher level of rapport and 
experienced less stress (i.e., reduced cardiovascular response) (Butler et al., 2003). 
Overall, the quality of social interaction is higher for reappraisers than suppressors. As a 
consequence, reappraisers are more likely to have a closer interpersonal relationship and 
are liked more by their peers than suppressors (Gross & John, 2003, study 4).   
Third, reappraisal promotes an overall positive emotional profile. A large-scale 
survey showed that in daily life, individuals who use reappraisal more frequently (high 
reappraisers) experience and express more positive emotions, and fewer negative 
emotions than individuals who use reappraisal less frequently (low reappraisers) (Gross 
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& John, 2003, study 3). Similar results were obtained in a lab paradigm where a strong 
negative emotion (anger) was induced. High reappraisers experienced more positive 
emotions and fewer negative emotions than low reappraisers (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & 
Gross, 2005). As can be seen, both a large-scale survey and a lab study showed that 
individuals who frequently use reappraisal experience a higher level of positive emotions 
and a lower level of negative emotions. 
Fourth, over the long term, reappraisal enhances individuals’ psychological well-
being. The use of reappraisal has been shown to be associated with greater life 
satisfaction and fewer depressive symptoms (Gross & John, 2003, study 5). Particularly, 
when encountering stressful life events, reappraisal protects stressed individuals against 
depression. More effective reappraisal use is associated with fewer depressive symptoms 
when individuals are in high stress situations (Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 
2010). In summary, reappraisal is an effective emotion regulation strategy associated 
with positive cognitive, socio-emotional and health outcomes. Overall, reappraisal 
contributes significantly to an individual’s psychological well-being. 
Types of reappraisal. Reappraisal involves cognitive reframing of emotional 
experiences to exert better control over initial emotional responses (Shiota & Levenson, 
2009). To reduce the effect of emotional responses, reappraisal directs one’s focus inward 
to modify one’s own thoughts and emotional experience. Reappraisal is a flexible 
strategy, which can be implemented in different ways, as demonstrated by various 
instructions across studies (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2011).  
Taking this line of research further, a distinction was made between two types of 
reappraisal: detached versus positive. In the short term, both detached and positive 
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reappraisal strategies were shown to be effective in down-regulating negative emotions 
(Ochsner et al., 2004; Shiota & Levenson, 2009) and up-regulating positive emotions 
(McRae et al., 2011). In the long term, both were associated with a higher level of 
subjective well-being (Gross & John, 2003; Shiota, 2006) and resilience against stress 
(Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). Importantly, however, these two strategies operate 
differently based on the types of reasoning that are recruited.  
Detached reappraisal involves reframing negative events in a detached manner by 
analyzing a negative experience objectively or technically (Gross, 1998). For example, 
when watching a frightening movie, people could tell themselves that a disturbing scene 
is not real, but the result of theatrical effect. Detached reappraisal has been used in 
numerous experiments on emotion regulation (e.g., Beauregard, Lévesque, & Bourgouin, 
2001; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2007; Lévesque et al., 2004; Ochsner, Bunge, 
Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002). In contrast, positive reappraisal is defined as reinterpreting 
negative information in a positive light by adopting a positive perspective, generating a 
positive thought, or finding positive meaning in the midst of a stressful event (Troy et al., 
2010; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007). This strategy is often described in self-help books or 
fortune cookies, such as “every uphill has a downhill” or “every cloud has a silver 
lining.”  
Positive reappraisal. In a real-life scenario, positive reappraisal would seem to be 
more adaptive than detached reappraisal, particularly in dealing with events of high 
personal significance. For example, when a beloved family member is dying, people 
cannot simply distance themselves from the event or experience the event objectively or 
technically, as one could do while watching a sad movie (i.e., detached reappraisal). 
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Doing so would be akin to denial or avoidance, and is not a realistic or adaptive approach 
to regulate emotions in the long term. In contrast, people who use positive reappraisal 
identify the negative aspect in the first place (e.g., yes, it is sad), but mainly focus on the 
positive aspect of the event. Positive reappraisal of a sad event (such as a death in the 
family) would be considering, for example, that the person you care for deeply no longer 
has to suffer, has lived a long and happy life, now rests in peace in the company of family 
and close friends, or might bring the family closer together. In summary, the appropriate 
use of positive reappraisal in negative events allows people to have closure on events that 
could otherwise cause intense and lingering distress. In other words, people can carry 
positive thoughts away from an otherwise distressing event and adopt a healthy outlook 
to enhance their well-being in life (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004).  
In the present study, I focus solely on positive reappraisal. One important 
function of positive reappraisal is to generate and maintain positive emotions when an 
individual is in the midst of a negative context (Folkman, 1997; Folkman & Moskowitz, 
2000; Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). The emergence of positive 
emotions in a negative context might seem counterintuitive, or even inappropriate, but 
studies have shown that amidst the hardship, positive emotions coexist with negative 
emotions (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000; Fredrickson et al., 2003), and the frequency of 
positive emotions is comparable to the frequency of negative emotions (see Folkman, 
2008, for review).  
Positive emotions. It has been suggested that positive emotions preserve an 
individual’s psychological well-being in a stressful condition, build up ego resilience 
(Cohn, Fredrickson, Brown, Mikels, & Conway, 2009), and facilitate the feeling of 
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meaningfulness in life (King, Hicks, Krull, & Del Gaiso, 2006). In addition, positive 
emotions generated in a negative context are associated with decreasing risks for 
depression (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007) and with personal growth in terms of 
increasing psychological resources (optimism, life satisfaction, and tranquility) when 
measured before and after the negative event (Fredrickson et al., 2003).  
These remarkable effects of positive emotions are illustrated and explained by the 
broaden-and-build theory, which posits that positive emotions broaden one’s thought-
action repertoire and build personal resources. Individuals who experience positive 
emotions are characterized by a global rather than local focus, suggesting that their 
attention is broadened. While one’s awareness and attention are enhanced and expanded, 
individuals are prone to engage in a more flexible and creative way of thinking and 
problem solving (Fredrickson, 2003). As a result, individuals are more likely to seek new 
experiences and actively approach other people to create or enhance social bonds. Over 
time, these actions build up personal resources, including skill development, social 
relations, physical health, and resilience, which in turn increase the likelihood of 
experiencing more positive emotions. Thus, positive emotions initiate a cycle of more 
positive emotions, leading toward enhanced well-being and many other advantages 
associated with positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001, 2004). In summary, employing 
positive reappraisal in negative contexts enhances the likelihood of positive emotions, 
which are associated with optimal psychological well-being and social outcomes. 
The majority of emotion regulation research has focused on individual differences 
in the decrement of negative emotions rather than on the enhancement of positive 
emotions (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000). This could be due to the following reasons. 
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First, positive emotions are more difficult to study than negative emotions. Fredrickson 
(2003) stated that positive emotions are not easily differentiated from each other and are 
lacking in distinguishable physiological markers. Second, the field of psychological 
health has a long-held tradition honoring the medical model with the focus on 
psychopathology, and most psychopathology is characterized by prolonged or intensified 
negative emotions. Third, people are biased in attending to negative emotions because 
many of the negative emotions are directly related to survival function (Folkman, 2008). 
For example, the emotion of fear alerts individuals the presence of danger, and thus 
increases the likelihood of avoiding dangerous situations and staying alive. Positive 
emotions, on the other hand, are not related to immediate survival function. Therefore, 
positive emotions are often overlooked in a negative context. 
To fully understand the effect of positive reappraisal on emotional experience, I 
argue that positive emotions deserve equal attention as negative emotions generated in a 
negative context. Therefore, this study focuses on the experience of positive emotions as 
the result of positive reappraisal. In particular, the emotions of happiness, love, and 
optimism are my variables of interest because these positive emotions are the targeted 
emotions in positive reappraisal. 
Reappraisal ability. A majority of reappraisal studies investigate trait 
reappraisal, which is measured by individuals’ self-report on their habitual use of 
reappraisal in daily life. For example, individuals rate the degree to which they endorse 
the following statement: “I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the 
situation I’m in” (Gross & John, 2003). The higher endorsement of the item indicates that 
individuals have higher trait reappraisal. Trait reappraisal has been documented to be 
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positively associated with health outcomes. Overall, trait reappraisal has contributed 
significantly to the body of knowledge in reappraisal; however, it turns out to be a less 
precise measure because it measures a collection of different aspects about reappraisal, 
such as the frequency, the motivation, and the ability of reappraisal use (Troy et al., 
2010). 
To differentiate these three aspects of reappraisal use, it is important to devise 
different measures that aim to examine each aspect of reappraisal. Researchers first 
focused on the ability of reappraisal use. They empirically examined individuals’ actual 
ability to regulate emotions after using reappraisal in a lab setting. The effectiveness of 
using reappraisal to regulate emotions is referred to as cognitive reappraisal ability (Troy 
et al., 2010). Cognitive reappraisal ability was operationalized as subjects’ self-ratings on 
changes in their emotional experience (negative emotions in particular) between 
unregulated and reappraisal conditions, when subjects received specific instructions to 
reappraise (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2011; Troy et al., 2010). Cognitive 
reappraisal ability has been shown to be an important predictor of mental health. 
Specifically, it has been shown to protect highly stressed individuals from escalating their 
depressive levels and thus enhance their psychological well-being (McRae et al., 2011; 
Troy et al., 2010). This critical reappraisal ability appears to vary considerably among 
individuals (McRae et al., 2011; Troy et al., 2010).  
The wide range of individual differences in reappraisal ability leads to a critical 
question: What mechanisms or processes might support this important ability to 
reappraise? This question is important because of its theoretical significance and 
implications. First, on a theoretical level, it can enhance our understanding of the 
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psychological processes involved in positive reappraisal. Second, from a practical 
perspective, identifying the supporting mechanisms or processes of positive reappraisal 
ability can potentially help individuals with low or impaired emotion regulatory function 
better utilize reappraisal when it is context-appropriate. More specifically, more effective 
intervention programs could be developed to train these individuals to use reappraisal in 
dealing with stress. Therefore, when considering both theoretical and practical aspects, 
investigating the supporting mechanism of reappraisal ability can potentially provide a 
unique contribution towards optimizing mental health. 
Reappraisal and Executive Function 
 Positive reappraisal requires individuals to reinterpret negative events in a more 
positive light. This process involves high-level cognitive control abilities. Executive 
function (EF), which is among high-level cognitive control abilities, includes components 
that mirror the process of positive reappraisal. Thus, EF becomes a very promising 
candidate for the process to support positive reappraisal.  
Subcomponents of EF. To further investigate how EF supports the processes in 
positive reappraisal, I first want to note the complex nature of EF. Housed in the 
prefrontal cortex, EF has been generally accepted as a unitary and also diverse construct 
(Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). EF is regarded as a set of high-level 
cognitive control abilities, including inhibition, working memory, and set shifting. These 
three subcomponents have been shown to correlate moderately with one another 
(correlation coefficients ranging from 0.42 to 0.63) but are also separate from one another 
(Miyake et al., 2000). Some researchers include cognitive flexibility as another 
subcomponent of EF (Fisk & Sharp, 2004; Gyurak et al., 2009; Lezak, 2004). Cognitive 
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flexibility is understood as the ability to generate responses quickly to meet 
predetermined rules. This component is often examined via verbal fluency tasks, which 
measure, for example, the number of words starting with the letter “A” that an individual 
can generate within a brief period (e.g., a minute). However, other researchers do not 
consider cognitive flexibility as the fourth subcomponent of EF because cognitive 
flexibility relies broadly on brain regions other than the frontal lobe. Some neural 
evidence showed that verbal fluency involves cortical and sub-cortical regions, including 
the temporal cortex (Troyer, Moscovitch, Winocur, Alexander, & Stuss, 1998) and the 
basal ganglia (Stuss et al., 1998). Thus, it is arguable that cognitive flexibility is not part 
of the EF because cognitive flexibility is not based on the processes shared by the three 
subcomponents of EF mentioned above. To be consistent with the common view of EF in 
the literature, I only discuss the three generally accepted subcomponents of EF: 
inhibition, working memory, and set shifting.  
Inhibition. Inhibition refers to the ability to suppress prepotent, automatic 
responses when necessary. Inhibition serves as an important information gatekeeper—
allowing the access of goal-relevant information and preventing goal-irrelevant 
information from entering the working memory (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). Multiple 
tasks have developed to examine inhibition. For example, the color Stroop task has been 
used broadly across studies to measure inhibition. Participants are presented with color 
words printed in incongruent color inks (e.g., the word “red” printed in blue instead of 
red ink) and asked to name the ink color. This task requires participants to attend to the 
ink color while inhibiting the prepotent impulse to read the word. This type of inhibition 
is known as the prepotent response inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2004).  
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In addition, researchers have proposed that inhibition is not a unitary component 
and involves several subcomponents (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). One subcomponent—
the negative priming effect—is, by definition, the delayed response to the target stimulus 
as a result of inhibiting a similar stimulus in the previous trial, while this similar stimulus 
was treated as an irrelevant distractor in the previous trial (Joormann, 2004, 2010; Tipper, 
1985). This subcomponent, which reflects inhibition, has been extensively studied (for 
review, see Fox, 1995; Tipper, 2001). More recently, individual differences in the 
negative priming effect (for negative materials) have been found to relate to the habitual 
use of emotion regulation strategies, such that better inhibition on negative materials is 
associated with more frequent use of reappraisal and less frequent use of suppression 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). 
In the context of reappraisal, inhibition is crucial in preventing individuals from 
perseverating on the salient but irrelevant features of the stimuli. Deficits in inhibition 
could lead to the failure to attend to or process task-relevant information and thus impede 
generating more adaptive appraisals with positive aspects (Joormann, 2010). For 
example, using reappraisal to lessen the emotional impact after reading Romeo & Juliet, 
individuals need to inhibit the focus on the tragic ending while trying to generate 
alternative appraisals. In summary, inhibition (of negative materials) is suggested to be a 
key component in positive reappraisal. 
Working memory. Working memory (WM) is the ability to store, update, and 
manipulate relevant information in short-term memory to serve a particular goal 
(Baddeley, 1986). WM differs from short-term memory in that it is not just about 
passively encoding and storing information, but also entails active processing (updating 
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and manipulating information). Therefore, WM is measured by tasks that involve both 
storage and processing. A key feature of the WM system is that the system has limited 
capacity, so the resources are divided between storage and processing (Bopp & 
Verhaeghen, 2005). One of many commonly used WM tasks is the backward word span 
task (Bryan & Luszcz, 1996; Passolunghi, Vercelloni, & Schadee, 2007), which is 
modified from the backward digit span used in Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale—
Revised (Wechsler, 1981). The backward word span task requires participants to recite a 
list of words in reverse order soon after they hear them. In addition to remembering 
increasing numbers of words (storage), participants also need to keep track of the 
temporal sequence of the list (update) and reorder the list in a reverse fashion 
(manipulation). In previous research, WM has been shown to positively correlate with the 
self-control ability (Black, Semple, Pokhrel, & Grenard, 2011) and the effectiveness of 
reappraisal use in terms of modulating emotional experience (McRae et al., 2011; 
Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). 
In the context of reappraisal, WM allows individuals to keep relevant information 
online, to update it in a timely fashion, and to manipulate it in a way that conforms to 
emotional goals (to preserve emotional well-being). An impairment or low capacity in 
WM could hinder the process of generating alternative appraisals or evaluating the 
current situation. Therefore, WM is suggested to be the second key component in positive 
reappraisal and to work in tandem with inhibition ability.  
Set shifting. Set shifting involves conscious shifting between different sets of 
rules, instructions, or operations (Monsell, 2003). It is important to note that set shifting 
is not synonymous with attention shifting (Miyake et al., 2000). Attention shifting 
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involves attention allocation and deployment, and can be achieved by making voluntary 
eye movements or covertly reorienting visual attention; set shifting involves a more 
deliberate process that involves conscious awareness of certain rules, instructions or 
operations. Set shifting abilities are typically measured by having participants shift focus 
between two sets of rules, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task. This task requires 
participants to sort through a deck of stimulus cards (printed with various shapes, colors, 
or quantities) based on immediate feedback (correct or incorrect) from the test 
administrator. At some point during the task, the sorting rule changes, and participants 
have to generate a few alternative rules and test them out respectively to see which new 
rule would apply in the current situation. To succeed, participants have to adopt the new 
rule immediately without perseverating on the old ones.  
In the context of reappraisal, I argue that set shifting is less relevant for the 
following reasons. First, set shifting is a specific and deliberate cognitive process, which 
requires shifting between explicit sets of rules and revising rules based on external 
feedback. In contrast, reappraisal is more of an internal dialogue than a task guided by 
rules and external feedback. Second, frequent switching between multiple thoughts (i.e., a 
low switching cost) could reflect flexible thinking; however, it could also be an indication 
of ineffective reappraisal. This is because frequent switching between thoughts may 
imply that the mind is cluttered with information and has difficulty filtering out irrelevant 
or less useful information. Thus, what set-shifting ability can predict is not clear. Lastly, 
from a practical perspective, I tried to minimize the participants’ burden by avoiding too 
many tasks at once—too many cognitive tasks in succession can wear out participants 
and thus lead to inaccurate test results. To sum up, for both theoretical and practical 
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reasons, this current study focuses on two subcomponents of the EF—inhibition and 
WM.  
Evidence for the contribution of EF to reappraisal. Neuroimaging work on 
reappraisal suggests EF is involved in the process of reappraisal. For example, the dorsal 
medial and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) were found to be activated during reappraisal. 
These regions have been documented to be responsible for two subcomponents of EF—
inhibition and WM. In addition, the left ventral lateral PFC was inversely correlated with 
emotion processing regions, such as the amygdala and the medial orbital frontal cortex, 
demonstrating the engagement of reappraisal to down-regulate negative emotions 
(Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Taken together, these findings lead 
to the conclusion that two subcomponents of EF (inhibition and WM) contribute to the 
reappraisal process wherein emotions are regulated.  
Limitations of previous studies and the focus of present research. There are 
four major limitations from previous studies. First, reappraisal is often studied in the 
construct of trait reappraisal, which can be very different from the actual ability to use 
reappraisal (i.e., reappraisal ability) because trait reappraisal combines several 
components of reappraisal—motivation, frequency, and ability. Studies have shown that 
these two constructs are modestly correlated, at best (McRae et al., 2011; Troy et al., 
2010). Therefore, in this study I focus on reappraisal ability rather than trait reappraisal to 
get a clean measure of individuals’ ability to use reappraisal. 
Second, the majority of studies on reappraisal focus on detached reappraisal, 
leaving positive reappraisal underexplored. Positive reappraisal is an effective and 
adaptive emotion regulation strategy, especially when individuals face negative events 
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that bear personal significance. Thus, to supplement our knowledge of this adaptive but 
less-studied strategy, my study focuses on positive reappraisal.  
Third, most studies on reappraisal or emotion regulation use the down-regulation 
of negative emotions as the indicator of reappraisal ability (McRae et al., 2011; Troy et 
al., 2010). I propose that positive emotions are equally important as negative emotions—
positive emotions always coexist with negative emotions and are positively associated 
with psychological well-being and optimal health outcomes (Fredrickson et al., 2003). 
Thus, I choose to use the up-regulation of positive emotions—positive reappraisal ability 
(PRA)—as the index of reappraisal ability in this study.  
Fourth, no empirical studies have examined the relationships between reappraisal 
and EF with emotional materials (i.e., valence-specific EF) (c.f. McRae et al., 2011; 
Schmeichel et al., 2008). EF is generally examined with non-emotional materials, such as 
alphabet (e.g., digit span), numbers (e.g., operation span), neutral words (e.g., the color 
Stroop task), or perceptual stimuli (e.g., colors or brightness in Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-
Lorenz, & Carstensen, 2005). However, examining valence-specific EF is important in 
the context of positive reappraisal and the reasons are illustrated as follows. 
The importance of valence-specific EF in positive reappraisal. First and 
foremost, emotional materials are the main ingredients being processed by positive 
reappraisal. Positive reappraisal involves dual processes of inhibiting negative 
information and storing, updating, and manipulating positive information (i.e., inhibition 
of negative information and WM for positive information; see Figure 1). Thus, valence-
specific EF is a more relevant and sensitive measure when it comes to investigating the 
high-level cognitive processes that might support PRA.  
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Second, previous studies have demonstrated that emotional materials are 
processed differently from non-emotional ones: People direct attention toward emotional 
materials faster than neutral ones (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) and have better 
memories for emotional materials than neutral ones (Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002; 
Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). Better memories mean that people are not only more likely 
to remember emotional information than neutral information, but also remember the 
contextual details of emotional information more vividly. The increased attention and 
memory performance in emotional information (as compared to neutral information) is 
called the emotion salience effect (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008), which has shown to be 
related to the amygdala. Better memory for emotional materials is correlated with a 
higher glucose metabolism rate in the amygdala (Cahill et al., 1996), and damages to the 
amygdala have been shown to offset the emotion salience effect (Adolphs, Cahill, Schul, 
& Babinsky, 1997). Therefore, different attention and memory performance in emotional 
versus non-emotional materials suggest the need to examine valence-specific EF. 
Third, research about psychopathology suggested that high-level cognitive 
processes with emotional materials are better predictors for emotional dysregulation than 
cognitive processes involving non-emotional materials. Studies have shown that some 
clinical populations process emotional materials differently from non-clinical 
populations. For example, Joormann et al. (2004, 2006) found that depressive patients 
exhibited deficits in inhibiting negative materials but not neutral materials. Similarly, 
Levens and Gotlib (2010) found that depressive participants had the tendency to keep 
negative information active in their WM (a negative bias) as compared to their never-
been-depressed counterparts, who exhibited the opposite pattern (a positive bias) when 
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processing emotional materials. Thus, because cognitive processes with emotional 
materials more accurately predict and reflect the impairment of emotion regulation than 
those with non-emotional materials, valence-specific EF should be considered when 
examining PRA.  
Taken together, three important factors suggest that valence-specific EF should be 
considered when examining its relationship to positive reappraisal: Emotional materials 
are the essential elements in positive reappraisal; emotional versus non-emotional 
materials are processed differently; and cognitive processes involving emotional 
materials better reflect the impairment of emotion regulatory function than cognitive 
processes involving non-emotional materials. Therefore, in this study, two 
subcomponents of EF with valence-specific information (i.e., neutral, positive, and 
negative valence) are used to address the question of which valence-specific EF might 
support PRA.      
Hypotheses I.  
            1.1 Inhibition of negative information will positively correlate with PRA. In 
contrast, inhibition of neutral information or inhibition of positive information will not 
correlate with PRA.  
           1.2 WM for positive information will positively correlate with PRA. In contrast, 
WM for neutral information or WM for negative information will not correlate with PRA.   
Age, Executive Function, and Positive Reappraisal Ability 
The term aging often comes with negative connotations—such as weakness, 
inability, and dysfunctional—and the long-held perception of irrevocable loss experience 
in a number of areas, including physical health, mental condition, and social relationships 
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(Smith & Bates, 1997). With the high prevalence of negative events, old age is often 
portrayed as a life stage rife with reduced emotional functioning, such as dampened affect.  
However, I argue that within this dense cloud of decline and loss, there is still a 
silver lining shimmering in the aging process: Emotional aging. Emotional development 
in adulthood is unique in that it does not parallel the path of physical and cognitive 
development, which peak in late adolescence and early adulthood, remain fairly stable in 
midlife and decline in old age (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000). 
Instead, emotional development (in terms of emotional functioning and emotional well-
being) seems to remain stable or even advance with age (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 
2003). In the following, I review emotional and cognitive aging in more detail because 
emotion and cognition are intricately intertwined (as described in the first part of this 
study), and they continue to be the main variables of interest in the second part of the 
study.  
Emotional aging. A growing body of empirical studies on life-span development 
have noted this aging paradox: Despite many undesirable aspects observed during the 
aging process, such as physical decline, cognitive degradation, and social loss, emotional 
functioning (i.e., experience, regulation) and emotional well-being do not appear to be 
compromised—at least not until a very late stage of life (Kryla-Lighthall & Mather, 
2008; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010).  
First, emotional experience has been studied in terms of intensity and frequency 
across ages. Regarding intensity, in lab experiments older adults reported comparable 
emotional intensity in both positive emotions (e.g., amusement in Tsai, Levenson, & 
Carstensen, 2000) and negative emotions (e.g., sadness in Kunzmann & Grühn, 2005; 
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disgust in Seider, Shiota, Whalen, & Levenson, 2011) to their younger counterparts in 
response to emotion-eliciting films. Consistently, in a large-scale survey about daily 
emotions, older adults reported similar levels of intensity in various positive and negative 
emotions as younger adults (Carstensen et al., 2000, study 1). Regarding frequency (the 
proportions that participants experience positive or negative emotions in a period of 
time), older adults reported experiencing positive emotions as often as younger adults 
across various situations; interestingly, older adults reported experiencing fewer negative 
emotions than younger adults across situations. The decline in frequency of negative 
emotions ceased around the age of 60, after which the frequency of negative emotions in 
daily life increased mildly for the rest of the adulthood. A large-scale survey revealed a 
similar age-related decline in frequency of negative emotions, but at a later age: Older 
adults (60 years and over) experienced depressed emotions less frequently than younger 
adults (18 to 30 years) during the year before the survey was taken (Lawton, Kleban, & 
Dean, 1993). A recent longitudinal study also found an age-related increase in frequency 
of positive emotions (Carstensen et al., 2010). Taken together, the intensity of positive 
and negative emotions appears to remain stable across adulthood. The frequency of 
emotional experience suggests a stable trajectory for positive emotions and a declining 
trajectory for negative emotions throughout most of the adulthood. 
Second, emotion regulation appears to improve and become more effective with 
age. The increased emotion regulation might explain why older adults experience positive 
emotions more frequently than younger adults. Older adults are more likely to maintain 
positive emotional states and to avoid negative emotional states across situations over 
time than younger adults. In addition, the flexibility of moving from a high negative 
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emotional state to a low negative emotional state was positively correlated with 
advancing age in adults aged 18 to 60. This age-related increase in emotion regulation, 
however, was not observed after age 60 (Carstensen et al., 2000, study 3). In terms of the 
effectiveness of emotion regulation, older adults appeared to regulate their emotions more 
strategically and flexibly in response to specific emotions and contexts (Blanchard-
Fields, 2007).  
Third, emotional well-being is often characterized by “the relative presence of 
positive affect, absence of negative affect, and satisfaction with life” (Myers & Diener, 
1995, p.11). A number of studies indicated that emotional well-being is relatively stable 
across ages: Older adults reported a similar level of well-being as middle-aged or 
younger adults, despite the physical constraints and social loss experienced in late 
adulthood (Baltes & Baltes, 1990); they also did not feel more or less satisfied with life 
than younger adults (Inglehart, 1990; Myers & Diener, 1995). In addition, some studies 
suggest that emotional well-being increases with age: Positive emotions increased in a 
quadratic fashion with age, and negative emotions decreased linearly up to age 74 
(Mroczek & Kolarz, 1998). This piece of evidence resonates with Carstensen et al. 
(2000), which showed an age-related increase in the frequency of positive emotions and 
an age-related decrease in the frequency of negative emotions experienced in daily life. 
To sum up, emotional functioning during the normal aging process is well preserved and 
might even improve. Relevant theories about emotional aging are introduced in the next 
three paragraphs.   
Socio-emotional selective theory. To explain the emotional aging in life-span 
development, socio-emotional selective theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) 
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suggests individuals’ perception of time over the course of adulthood shifts their 
motivation to prioritize goals. Younger adults perceive time as expansive or unlimited; 
thus, they tend to focus on task-oriented goals and invest resources and energy into tasks 
or activities that could broaden their horizons and potentially benefit them in the future 
(e.g., pursuing an academic degree, career, or new experiences). In contrast, older adults 
perceive their remaining time as limited. Given this limited time perspective as a result of 
aging, older adults tend to shift away from task-oriented goals to emotional goals (e.g., to 
increase emotional well-being).  
Prioritizing emotional goals over task-oriented goals in old age further motivates 
older adults to allocate mental and behavioral resources, such as attention and memory 
(Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003) to process emotional materials in ways that 
conform to their emotional goals. This allows older adults to experience higher levels of 
positive emotions and lower levels of negative emotions than younger adults. In addition, 
the emphasis on emotional goals also motivates older adults to recruit effective emotion 
regulation strategies, which also enhances positive emotions and decreases negative 
emotions (Carstensen et al., 2003). This motivational account explains why older adults 
tend to keep a smaller but closer social circle (e.g., Lang, 2001) to maintain emotionally 
meaningful relationships and decrease the likelihood of encountering or experiencing 
negative emotions (Carstensen et al., 1999). In summary, the socio-emotional selective 
theory contends that older adults are motivated in enhancing their emotional well-being.  
Dynamic-interaction theory. In addition to the motivational shift in adulthood as 
an explanation for emotional aging, Labouvie-Vief (2003, 2009) proposed an alternative 
account, dynamic-interaction theory, which emphasizes the role of cognitive-affective 
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complexity in emotional development across the lifespan. Cognitive-affective complexity 
refers to the integration and growth of emotion understanding, leading to the 
understanding of self. Beginning in adolescence and lasting until mid-adulthood, 
individuals develop the ability to understand and integrate more complex emotions, 
particularly mixed emotions (e.g., bittersweet). They also gain more insight into their 
own emotional states, which facilitates developing self-identity (as being an independent 
individual). The cognitive-affective complexity decreases around the early 60s.  
Dynamic-interaction theory contends that the seemingly well-preserved emotional 
well-being in late adulthood (i.e., high levels of positive emotions and low levels of 
negative emotions) is not an indication of increased resilience in older adults, but a 
reflection of reduced cognitive-affective complexity. The decreased cognitive-affective 
complexity implies a decreased ability to integrate negative affect into the daily 
emotional profile. As a consequence, older adults may find negative emotions less 
tolerable and try to regulate based on their declined cognitive resources. To succeed in 
regulation, older adults might prefer strategies like optimization to increase positive 
emotions rather than combating with negative emotions. Optimization is thus suggested 
as an emotion regulation strategy to compensate for the age-related decline in cognitive-
affective complexity. Taken together, reduced cognitive-affective complexity with age 
facilitates employing optimization to regulate emotions, leading to the positive emotional 
profile in late adulthood.  
Knowledge of emotions and emotion regulation. Furthermore, it is possible that 
life-long learning and practice assist older adults to be better at anticipating and 
regulating emotions, which further benefit their emotional well-being. That is, with 
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accumulated life experience, older adults are more knowledgeable about the effect of 
emotions (Scheibe, Mata, & Carstensen, 2011). They are as accurate as their younger 
counterparts in predicting their emotional responses following an emotion-eliciting event, 
but older adults have shown better predictions in their arousal levels than younger adults 
(Nielsen, Knutson, & Carstensen, 2008). Older adults also report higher levels of 
confidence in controlling their emotions (Gross et al., 1997).  
In addition, emotion regulation processes also become less effortful for older 
adults (Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009): They appear to be more strategic in dealing 
with daily life stressors, such that they tailor problem-solving strategies contingent upon 
the context and adopt multiple strategies, including both instrumental and emotion 
regulation strategies (Blanchard-Fields, 2007). That is, older adults can quickly identify 
cases when there is no quick fix for certain problems; instead of solely engaging in 
problem-solving behaviors, they also recruit strategies to regulate emotions at the same 
time to preserve emotional well-being. In summary, as a result of abundant knowledge 
and experience in emotion regulation, older adults seem to better master the skill of 
selecting appropriate emotion regulation strategies based on contexts.  
Summary. Overall, older adults exhibit well-preserved emotional functioning, 
including emotional experience, emotion regulation ability, and emotional well-being. 
They are motivated to prioritize emotional goals over task-oriented goals and to devote 
resources to emotion regulation to preserve well-being. Optimization, a useful strategy 
for dealing with age-related decline in cognitive- affective complexity, is one of the few 
emotion regulation strategies seen in late adulthood. In addition, accumulated emotion-
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related knowledge helps older adults to be better at regulating emotions. Therefore, I 
predict to see PRA increase with age (Hypothesis 2.1).  
Furthermore, this unique positive emotional profile in older adults leads to an 
important question: Do the relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF change as 
a function of age? To approach this question, the first step is to understand the 
developmental trajectory of valence-specific EF (inhibition and WM) in adulthood.  
Cognitive aging. Cognitive aging has been regarded as an insidious, inevitable, 
and irrevocable consequence of aging. In particular, the decline in high-level cognitive 
function (the EF) carried out by the PFC is the first and most noticeable sign of cognitive 
aging. It has consistently suggested that the PFC is a more susceptible target of aging 
than any other brain region. Studies have shown reduced volume, rapid decline of grey 
matter density (Sowell et al., 2003), decreased white matter density (Grieve, Williams, 
Paul, Clark, & Gordon, 2007), and reduced cerebral blood flow in the PFC compared to 
other brain regions (Gur, Gur, Obrist, Skolnick, & Rei-vitch, 1987), as well as diminished 
connectivity between the PFC and other brain regions in older adults (Sullivan & 
Pfefferbaum, 2006). These age-related changes in the PFC are manifested through 
decreased performance in EF.  
However, it is important to note that EF is a complex system comprised of a 
number of subcomponents and each subcomponent of EF does not deteriorate at the same 
rate (MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002). Therefore, regarding the two 
subcomponents of EF that I specifically focus on in this study—inhibition and WM—I 
predict a differential declining rate of EF in old age. The following paragraphs further 
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discuss age effects on inhibition and WM as they pertain to the valence-specific 
information being processed. 
 Inhibition and aging. According to the inhibitory deficit theory of cognitive 
aging (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), older adults are more susceptible to interference and thus 
show reduced efficiency in inhibiting irrelevant information. Consistent with this theory, 
previous studies have found age differences in the negative priming effect: Younger 
adults (age 18 to 22) demonstrated the negative priming effect (of letters or three-letter 
words) whereas older adults (age 62 to 75) did not (Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Rypma, 
1991; Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994).  
 However, not all of the existing evidence shows an age-related decline in 
inhibition (McDowd, 1997; Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, & Logan, 1994). For example, 
Connelly and  Hasher (1993) found equivalent negative priming effects in younger and 
older adults in tasks requiring the participants to identify the location rather than the 
identity of the stimuli. They proposed that age-related decline in the negative priming 
effect could be driven by the stimulus type, and they further argued that inhibitory 
processes are not unitary. In addition, the negative priming effect in older adults was 
found in samples with relatively high intelligence scores (Kramer et al., 1994; Sullivan & 
Faust, 1993). The older adult sample in Kramer et al. (1994) had intelligence scores one 
standard deviation above the population mean, and the older adult sample in Sullivan and 
Faust (1993) had intelligence scores higher than the age norm. Consistently, the most 
recent meta-analysis examining executive control across adulthood showed the absence 
of age-related decline in inhibition across studies: Older adults did not perform more 
poorly than younger adults in these inhibitory tasks after taking into account age 
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differences in baseline performance, but older adults did perform more poorly in 
switching tasks and dual tasks (Verhaeghen, 2011). The study argued that only specific 
executive control abilities decline with age, and inhibition is not one of them. 
 Taken together, based on the literature summarized above, the majority of studies 
and more recent studies on inhibition across adulthood point to a well-preserved 
inhibitory process in older adults. In addition, the characteristics of the older adults in my 
sample appeared to show relatively equivalent education levels (i.e., college) and higher 
vocabulary scores relative to their younger counterparts. This is similar to the sample 
characteristics in Kramer et al. (1994). Therefore, I predict that inhibition of neutral 
information (measured by the negative priming task) will not differ across age 
(Hypothesis 2.2a). 
 Inhibition of valence-specific information and aging. Inhibition of valence-
specific information (inhibition of negative and positive information) is often studied as a 
part of emotional processes in cases of psychopathology (e.g., Joormann, 2004; Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) but has not been examined extensively in the context of 
aging. Only three studies have investigated inhibition of valence-specific information 
across adulthood, using either the negative affective priming task (e.g., Goeleven, De 
Raedt, & Dierckx, 2010) or the emotional Stroop task (e.g., Ashley & Swick, 2009; 
Wurm, Labouvie-Vief, Aycock, Rebucal, & Koch, 2004).   
 Findings from these three studies on inhibition of valence-specific information are 
mixed. Goeleven et al. (2010) found that older adults exhibited lower levels of inhibition 
of negative information than younger adults, and no difference was found in inhibition of 
positive information between older and younger adults. The other two studies using the 
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emotional Stroop task showed different results: Ashley and Swick (2009) found that 
younger adults showed lower levels of inhibition of negative information than neutral 
information, but older adults did not show differences in inhibition between negative and 
neutral information. In contrast, Wurm et al. (2004) found that older adults showed lower 
levels of inhibition across valence, but they did not predict or find an interaction effect of 
age by valence or a valence effect (Wurm et al., 2004). Specifically, older adults showed 
lower levels of inhibition across the board (neutral, positive, and negative). In conclusion, 
the evidence for inhibition of valence-specific information across adulthood is mixed.  
 It is difficult to generalize findings from these studies, so their conclusions cannot 
be directly applied to this current study. The past studies are subject to confounds 
inherent in task designs, and the findings could be task-dependent. For example, 
Goeleven et al. (2010) introduced neutral stimuli (faces) as distractors in the control 
condition but not in the priming condition, creating a confound between the two 
conditions. In addition, neutral faces are sometimes ambiguous in valence and are often 
perceived as negative rather than neutral. Thus, the presentation of neutral faces (paired 
with negative faces) could slow down responses. Older adults, who have relatively 
limited cognitive resources, are particularly susceptible to this additional requirement in 
processing neutral faces. Their reaction time in the control condition increases, resulting 
in a low inhibition score (which is the difference in reaction time between the priming 
and control conditions). In addition, older and younger adults have been shown to use 
different brain regions to process facial expressions (Gunning-Dixon et al., 2003). Thus, 
it is difficult to rule out the possibility that age-related face processing increases the 
response time for older adults rather than age-related decline in inhibition. Similarly, 
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differing results in the two studies using the emotional Stroop task might stem from 
variations in the experimental paradigm driven by the variable of interest in each study 
(e.g., arousal level vs. valence): Wurm et al. (2004) were mainly interested in examining 
individuals’ inhibition of materials with three types of arousal level (low vs. medium vs. 
high), and thus equated the arousal level across neutral, positive, and negative words. 
Therefore, even if there were a valence effect, it would be cancelled out by the equally 
distributed arousal levels in each valence. In summary, the problems inherent in task 
designs prevent us from drawing a definite conclusion in this matter. 
 However, these past studies still provide some valuable insight by presenting 
relevant theories about the development of inhibition of valence-specific information 
across adulthood. First, Wurm et al. (2004) proposed that declines in cognitive resources 
in old age make older adults less successful in inhibiting or disengaging the interference 
from more automatic and lower-level information (e.g., emotional information) than 
younger adults. Building upon Wurm et al., Ashley and Swick (2009) proposed that the 
valence of emotional information also needs to be considered because it can affect 
information processing in different ages. Specifically, they considered the negativity bias 
or effect in younger adults, which refers to younger adults’ preferential processing 
(attention and memory) in negative information (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001). From their results, Ashley and Swick reasoned that the negativity effect 
might exist because younger adults have a more difficult time disengaging negative 
information relative to neutral information. On the other hand, older adults in their study 
did not show differences between the inhibition of negative and neutral information, 
suggesting a relatively well-preserved inhibition of negative information in late 
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adulthood. However, Ashley and Swick did not include positive materials in their study, 
so whether inhibition of positive information is also well preserved in old age needs 
further investigation.  
 To help fill this gap of knowledge in the development of inhibition of valence-
specific information, the well-known phenomenon of the positivity effect might disclose 
some hints. The positivity effect refers to the phenomenon that older adults preferentially 
process positive over negative information (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Knight, 2005). Whether the positivity effect is primarily 
driven by the decreased processing of negative information or the increased processing of 
positive information is still contested (Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005). Regardless, either 
way leads to the same conclusion: an increased ratio of positivity over negativity with 
advancing age (Charles et al., 2003; Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010). One possibility is that 
as people age, they become better at inhibiting negative information and worse at 
inhibiting positive information. Thus, I predict that A) inhibition of negative information 
will increase with age, and B) inhibition of positive information will decrease with age 
(Hypothesis 2.2a).   
 WM and aging. WM has been found to decline with age across measures in 
cross-sectional studies (Borella, Carretti, & De Beni, 2008; Borella, Ghisletta, & 
Ribaupierre, 2011; Hale et al., 2011; Linden, Brédart, & Beerten, 1994). Decreased WM 
capacity in old age has been suggested to be the result of age-related declines in 
processing (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995), limited attention 
resources (Craik, 1982), reduced coordination capacity (coordination between storage 
and processing) (Mayr & Kliegl, 1993), and decline in the capacity of central executives 
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(Linden et al., 1994). These declines explain why the size of the decrease in short-term 
memory is smaller than the decline in WM. Short-term memory relies only on storage, 
whereas WM involves both storage and processing and the coordination of both. This 
higher demand involves processing, attention, and coordination of resources that short-
term memory does not require. Examples of short-term memory tasks used in previous 
studies are forward digit span and letter span; examples of WM tasks are reading span 
and computation span.  
 The backward word span task is selected in this study to examine individuals’ WM, 
and the following focuses on age-related findings. Backward span tasks include two 
versions: the backward digit span task and the backward word span task. Consistently 
throughout the literature, performance in the backward span tasks has been shown to 
decline with age. A meta-analysis on aging and verbal memory tasks (including both 
short-term memory and WM tasks) shows that performance in the backward digit span 
task declines with age (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). In addition, age differences in the 
backward digit span task are found to be larger than those in the forward digit span task, 
but smaller than those in other WM span tasks (e.g., reading span). Similarly, Bryan and 
Luszcz (1996) examined younger and older adults’ WM using the backward word span 
task, and also found declines in WM in old age. Taken together, based on the literature 
summarized above, I predict WM for neutral information will decline with age 
(Hypothesis 2.2b). 
WM for valence-specific information and aging. As shown, WM declines with 
age; on the other hand, older adults are known to process emotional information 
differently from younger adults, raising the question about the development of WM for 
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emotional information (also known as WM for valence-specific information or affective 
WM) across adulthood. However, there is only one published study that specifically 
tested WM for valence-specific information across age groups. Mikels et al. (2005) 
examined younger and older adults’ WM for valence-specific information, which refers 
to the ability to maintain initial emotional intensity and to compare this initial emotional 
intensity with another emotional intensity evoked by a later stimulus (e.g., emotion-
eliciting pictures). They did not find an age-related decrease in WM for valence-specific 
information; instead, they found that older adults showed better WM for positive 
information relative to negative information, whereas younger adults showed the opposite 
pattern—better WM for negative information relative to positive information. In addition, 
for positive information, older adults actually showed better WM than younger adults. 
Their findings demonstrated that WM for emotional information is well preserved in old 
age, lending support for the positivity effect in old age.  
However, the paradigm used in Mikels et al. (2005)—a modified delayed response 
task—appears to be a “simple span task.” Simple span tasks (e.g., digit span) rely mostly 
on maintenance or storage and minimally on processing, in contrast to complex span 
tasks (e.g., reading span or operation span), which demand both storage and processing to 
a similar extent (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). In this modified delayed 
response task, individuals need to store the emotional intensity of the first image over a 
brief period (3 seconds) until the second image appears and then must quickly compare 
the emotional intensity. The processing demand appears to be minimal, and thus only 
qualifies this task as a simple span task. Simple span tasks have been documented to 
decline with age at a slower rate, and the size of the decline is smaller relative to complex 
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span tasks. This may explain why the positivity effects of WM were found in this specific 
paradigm.  
 The majority of WM measures that allow for testing valence-specific information, 
including the backward word span task in my study, use a pure block design. It means 
that each valence of materials is tested separately rather than together. This aspect of WM 
tasks is different from that of many other attention or memory tasks in which the 
positivity effect was found (c.f. Charles et al., 2003; Mather & Carstensen, 2003). For 
example, Charles et al. (2003) presented a series of emotional images in random order 
and asked participants to recall emotional images 15 minutes after the presentation. In 
this case, images with different valences compete for attention and memory capacity, and 
thus the positivity effect emerges. In contrast, most of the WM measures do not involve 
more than one valence at a time. For example, consider the backward word span task: In 
the positive version, participants recite positive words in a reverse order; in a negative 
version, participants recite negative words in a reverse order. Words of different valence 
never mix in the same trial. In this case, there is no context for the positivity effect to 
occur. Therefore, I do not think the positivity effect applies in the context of WM while 
WM is tested by the backward word span task. 
 Taken together, considering the overwhelming evidence showing the age-related 
decline in WM and the pure block design of WM measures, I predict that WM for 
positive information and WM for negative information decrease with age in the same 
way as WM for neutral information (Hypothesis 2.2b).  
Intersection between emotional aging and cognitive aging. My reviews of 
emotional and cognitive aging show that although emotion and cognition take 
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unparalleled developmental paths, they continue to interact throughout adulthood. Their 
interaction has been studied most extensively in late adulthood and is known as the 
positivity effect. The positivity effect shown in attention and memory has been suggested 
to be a part of the emotion regulation processes for older adults (Carstensen, Mikels, & 
Mather, 2006; Kryla-Lighthall & Mather, 2009; Shiota & Levenson, 2009). However, a 
recent review by Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields (2012) did not find direct evidence that 
the positivity effect in itself is emotion regulation. In other words, having a certain 
attention or memory pattern does not make the person feel happier. They emphasized the 
importance of conceptualizing the positivity effect as one of the processes that relate to 
emotion regulation, and they suggested the need for additional study to investigate the 
relationships between the positivity effect (in cognitive processes) and emotion 
regulation.  
Therefore, I take this research further by asking how age-related changes in 
cognitive processes (valence-specific EF) relate to the ability to use positive reappraisal 
(PRA) at different stages of adulthood. In other words, is it possible that the age-related 
change in inhibition of negative information supports PRA to a greater or lesser extent for 
older adults than for younger adults? Similarly, is it possible that the age-related change 
in WM for positive information supports PRA to a greater or lesser extent for older adults 
than for younger adults? Therefore, in the next step, I investigate the relationships 
between valence-specific EF and PRA, using age as a moderator. This question could 
potentially provide an opportunity to explore how younger and older adults might employ 
positive reappraisal, based on the age-related differences in their cognitive processes. 
This is an important question that has not yet been empirically investigated. 
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Valence-specific EF and PRA by age. As reviewed earlier, older adults are 
motivated to preserve emotional well-being. To achieve their emotional goals, positive 
reappraisal is a useful and conceivable strategy. The processes in positive reappraisal 
involve high-level cognitive control abilities (inhibition of negative information and WM 
for positive information). Due to potential cognitive changes as a result of age, older 
adults might use different cognitive functions to a different extent to support PRA. In 
other words, the way PRA relies on inhibition and WM might vary to different degrees 
across age, depending on how well inhibition and WM are preserved in aging. Based on 
my review on inhibition and aging, if inhibition of negative information does not decline 
or even increases with age, its contribution to PRA should increase with age. In contrast, 
if WM for positive information decreases with age, it will not be sufficient to support 
PRA, and thus the relationships between WM for positive information and PRA should 
decrease with age. 
In summary, I predict that the relationships between PRA and inhibition of negative 
information increase with age (Hypothesis 2.3), and the relationships between PRA and 
WM for positive information decrease with age (Hypothesis 2.4). 
Limitations of previous studies. As illustrated here, a large body of research has 
investigated emotional or cognitive aging, but less attention has been devoted to the 
intersection of emotion regulation and cognitive processes over the course of adulthood. 
This limits our understanding of the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA 
across the adult life span. In addition, as mentioned in the first part of this study, the other 
limitation is a paucity of research on valence-specific EF, and thus there is even less 
information about age-related changes in valence-specific EF. The existing studies about 
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the development of valence-specific EF have only yielded mixed results, and thus require 
replication. To address these limitations, I use the same sample in the first part of the 
study, which is a community sample with a wide age range of 18 to 72 years to examine 
the relationships between each key variable (PRA and valence-specific EF) and age; I 
also examine the relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF as a function of 
age. 
Hypotheses II. Four main hypotheses were proposed in the second part of the 
study. 
2.1. PRA will increase with age.  
2.2. The relationships between valence-specific EF and age include:  
            a. Inhibition of neutral information will stay constant across age; inhibition of 
positive information will decrease with age; inhibition of negative information will 
increase with age. 
           b. WM for neutral, positive, and negative information will decline with age.  
           2.3. The relationships between inhibition of negative information and PRA will 
change as a function of age in the following ways:  
 a. Because the inhibition of negative information is not expected to decline or 
even increase with age, its contribution to PRA is expected to increase with age.  
 b. Inhibition of neutral information and inhibition of positive information are not 
expected to correlate with PRA at the first place, so the relationships between them and 
PRA will remain non-significant.  
           2.4. The relationships between WM for positive information and PRA will change 
as a function of age in the following ways: 
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a. Because WM for positive information is expected to decrease with age, its 
contribution to PRA is expected to decrease with age.  
b. WM for neutral and negative information are not expected to correlate with 
PRA at the first place, so the relationships between them and PRA will remain non-
significant. 
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Chapter Two: Method 
Overview 
This research was a part of a larger project (Denver Emotional Adjustment and 
Responses to Stress, DEARS), which aimed to study a group of stressed individuals who 
had experienced one stressful life event within the eight weeks of the study. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, I only present information that is related to the current study. 
This study included two phases: First, participants filled out online questionnaires 
regarding demographic information. Second, participants came into a lab session, which 
took place within two weeks after they filled out the questionnaires.   
Participants 
Participants were recruited through advertisement on online bulletins (Craigslist), 
or postings in public areas (laundromats, libraries, and local hospitals). Three hundred 
and thirty nine individuals responded to recruitment materials and were phone-
interviewed by a trained research assistant to establish that they were fluent in English, 
and were older than 18 years. If they met these criteria and agreed to participate, they 
were asked to fill out an online questionnaire regarding demographic information and 
were invited to a lab session within two weeks of the phone interview. Participants were 
compensated $35 dollars at the end of the lab session. Eighty-nine respondents were 
excluded (See Table 1). As a result, 250 eligible individuals (135 female) between the 
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ages of 18 and 72 years (M = 40.81, SD = 12.37) from the Denver Metro Area were 
included in the final sample. Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 2.  
Procedure 
Within two weeks of the phone interview, participants were invited to the lab 
session, which took place at the emotional regulation lab at the University of Denver. 
Upon arrival, each participant was greeted by a research assistant and escorted to a quiet 
and cozy experimental room with neutral lighting. The lab session began with a consent 
procedure. During this time, the research assistant carefully explained the purpose of the 
research, experimental procedures and compensation, and answered any related questions 
that the participant might have. After authorizing his or her consent, the participant was 
left alone in the experimental room to complete an online questionnaire, which measured 
depressive symptoms and the perceived impact stress level, while the research assistant 
stayed in an adjacent room. These two rooms were connected via intercom. This 
questionnaire part of the study took about 20 to 30 minutes. After that, the research 
assistant returned to administer several cognitive tasks, including a vocabulary test, and 
measures of inhibition and WM (see Measures section below).  
 Next, the positive reappraisal task was administered via a computer. Participants 
were asked to carefully watch a series of film clips and to provide emotion ratings after 
each film clip (see Figure 2). Short film clips have been used to elicit sadness emotion 
successfully (Troy et al., 2010) and have shown to be more ecologically valid than 
emotional stimuli presented in words or pictures (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). To 
begin with, a three-minute neutral film depicting a natural scene was presented. The 
purpose of the neutral film was to induce a neutral mood across participants. After the 
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neutral film, three short sad films were presented in a row to elicit a moderate level of 
sadness. Each short clip was about two-minutes long and from these movies: Fatal 
attraction, Kramer vs. Kramer, and I am Sam. Participants were asked to rate their 
positive and negative emotions on a nine-point Likert scale after each film clip, with one 
indicating “not at all” and nine indicating “extremely”. For two of the three sad films, 
participants were simply asked to “watch the film carefully”; for the remaining film, 
participants were asked to follow the positive reappraisal instruction to reappraise in a 
positive light. The full reappraisal instruction is presented in the appendix C.  
To avoid potential confounding factors such as habituation to sad films or the 
regression to the mean, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental groups (Troy et al., 2010). Each group watched these films in the same 
order, but with the reappraisal instruction shown in a different sad film clip. Participants 
in Group 1 were instructed to use reappraisal during the second sad film; participants in 
Group 2 were instructed to use reappraisal during the third sad film (see Figure 2). For 
emotion ratings, participants rated 17 different kinds of emotions, including both negative 
emotions (e.g., sadness, anger, and fear) and positive emotions (e.g., happiness, love, and 
optimism). Each participant was debriefed at the end of the session and compensated $35 
dollars for their lab participation. 
Measures 
Mental health. Individuals’ mental health was assessed with the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1984). The BDI consists of 21 multiple-choice items 
about depressive symptoms experienced during the past week. Each item provides four 
statements describing the depressive symptom, ranging in severity. In each item, 
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participants are asked to choose the statement that best describes how they have felt in 
the past week. One question about suicidal ideation was taken out, leaving 20 items in 
total. Each item is scored on a 0 to 3 scale and the BDI score is summed across 20 items. 
The BDI has been shown to have good internal consistency among the young adult 
population (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004) and the community dwelling old adult 
population (Segal, Coolidge, Cahill, & O'Riley, 2008). The internal consistency of the 
BDI in my sample was .94. The BDI has also been used widely across studies to measure 
the current mental health state (Warr, 1990). Higher BDI scores (higher levels of 
depressive symptoms) indicate lower levels of mental health. The average BDI score in 
my sample was 10.26 (SD = 9.49, Range: 0 - 42). 
Cognitive functioning. Individuals’ cognitive functioning was indexed by the 
verbal ability measured with the vocabulary subtest of the Shipley Institute of Living 
Scale (Zachary & Shipley, 1986). This vocabulary subtest consists of 40 multiple-choice 
questions, in which participants are asked to choose the synonym of a target word from a 
set of four words. The vocabulary score is computed as the total numbers of correct 
responses out of forty. Administration time for this vocabulary subtest is about 10 
minutes. The vocabulary subtest was originally designed as a brief screening tool for 
measuring individuals’ general intelligence (verbal ability in particular). Thus, in my 
study, I use the vocabulary score to represent individuals’ cognitive functioning. Higher 
scores indicate higher levels of cognitive functioning. The average verbal ability in my 
sample was 33.10 (SD = 3.64, Range: 0 - 40). 
Perceived stress impact level. The perceived stress impact level was measured 
with the Life Experiences Survey (LES; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). The LES 
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consists of 46 items about a wide range of life stressors, including both negative (e.g., 
divorce) and positive events (e.g., getting a new job). Each item asks A) if the person has 
experienced a particular stressor within the past 6 months (Yes or No), and B) the degree 
to which the stressor has an impact on the person (ranging from - 3 as extremely negative 
to 0 as no impact and + 3 as extremely positive). Because the majority of my sample 
experienced some stressors before the recruitment, the scores of the perceived negative 
impact of events during the past six months were used in the study. The perceived stress 
impact level was calculated as the summation of impact scores from negative events and 
was reverse-coded. Higher scores reflect higher perceived stress impact levels. The 
average perceived stress impact level in my sample was 7.06 (SD = 7.03, Range: 0 - 34). 
Sadness ratings. Sadness ratings after each film clip were collected to serve two 
purposes. This was to verify the sadness induction in the emotion-eliciting paradigm 
(manipulation check). Second, sadness ratings were used as one of the exclusion criteria. 
Participants who reported zero level of sadness after watching the baseline sad film were 
not included in my final sample (see Table 1).  
Previous experience with films. Because the sad films used in the study were 
clips from movies, there was a concern that participants’ previous experience with the 
movie might influence the way they perceived the film and thus affected their ratings of 
positive emotions. For example, participants who had seen the movie might rate their 
positive emotions higher than participants who had not, because they have already 
processed the information and shielded themselves from the negative impact. Thus, it was 
important to collect information about participants’ previous experience with each film in 
order to rule out this possibility.  
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Positive reappraisal ability (PRA). Positive reappraisal ability (PRA) was 
operationalized as the ability to increase positive emotions in a negative context after 
receiving instructions to reappraise in a positive way; PRA was computed as the 
standardized score of positive emotion ratings in the reappraisal films. I chose to use the 
standardized score rather than the raw score because half of the participants received 
reappraisal instructions in the second sad film, and the other half of the participants did so 
in the third sad film (see Figure 2).  Standardized scores allow PRA to be comparable 
across the two groups.  
Emotion ratings on six positive emotions (amusement, happiness, interest, love, 
optimism, and pride) were collected, but only three of them were the targeted positive 
emotions in the reappraisal instruction: happiness, love, and optimism. Amusement, 
interest, and pride served only as filler questions to prevent participants from guessing the 
research purpose. Thus, three PRA scores were generated and included in analyses: PRA-
Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism. A higher PRA score means a higher level of 
discrete positive emotion being generated in positive reappraisal, and thus it indicates 
better PRA.      
Emotion reactivity (ER). Emotion reactivity was referred to as the initial 
unregulated emotional response to the emotion-eliciting films. Thus, the ER was 
operationalized by emotion ratings on positive emotions after the first sad film (the 
baseline sad film). In parallel with PRA scores, three standardized ER scores were 
generated and included in my analyses: ER-Happiness, ER-Love, and ER-Optimism. The 
higher ER score means a higher level of discrete positive emotion in response to the 
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baseline sad film, and thus it indicates a greater reactivity of positive emotion before 
engaging in reappraisal strategy. 
Executive function (EF). Two subcomponents of EF were examined: inhibition 
and WM. Each subcomponent was examined on neutral and affective materials to 
separate valence-specific EF. Inhibition was measured with the negative priming task 
(inhibition of neutral information) and the negative affective priming task (inhibition of 
positive information and inhibition of negative information). WM was examined by the 
backward word span task in both neutral (WM for neutral information) and affective 
versions (WM for positive information and WM for negative information). Further 
description of these tasks is as follows. 
Inhibition. Inhibition of neutral information was measured with the negative 
priming task (Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995). The negative priming task includes a series 
of paired trials: a prime-trial and a test-trial. In each trial, two words (one distracter and 
one target) are presented simultaneously on a computer screen. Participants are instructed 
to ignore the distracter (in red) and pay attention to the target (in blue); meanwhile, they 
have to identify whether the target word is “living or nonliving” by key pressing. 
Participants are not aware of the separation of the prime- and test-trial (see Figure 3a). 
Two conditions are included in the paradigm: the priming condition and the 
control condition. In the priming condition, the distracter presented in the prime-trial 
shares the same attribute (living or nonliving) with the target in the following test-trial. In 
the control condition, the distracter in the prime-trial does not share the same attribute as 
the target in the following test-trial. In the priming condition, when the inhibition of the 
attribute of the distracter of the prime- trial is still active, responses to the target with the 
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same attribute in the test-trial should be delayed. The delayed reaction time toward the 
target word in the test-trial is referred to as the negative priming effect, which reflects 
inhibition of neutral information. Because the main function of the prime-trial is to 
manipulate the negative priming effect, only the reaction time toward the target in the 
test-trial is used in the following analyses. The negative priming effect is calculated by 
subtracting the reaction time toward the target in the control condition from the reaction 
time toward the target in the priming condition. The higher value indicates a stronger 
inhibition of neutral information (Inhibition-Neutral).   
Similarly, inhibition of positive information and inhibition of negative information 
were measured with the negative affective priming task (Joormann, 2004). This task also 
includes a series of paired trials: a prime-trial and a test-trial. In each trial, two words 
(one distracter and one target) are presented simultaneously on a computer screen. 
Participants are instructed to ignore the distracter (in red) and pay attention to the target 
(in blue); meanwhile, they have to evaluate whether the target word is “positive valence 
or negative valence” by key pressing. Participants are not aware of the separation of the 
prime- and test- trial (see Figure 3b). 
Two conditions are included in the paradigm: the priming condition and the 
control condition. In the priming condition, the distracter presented in the prime-trial 
shares the same valence (positive or negative) with the target in the following test-trial. In 
the control condition, the distracter in the prime-trial does not share the valence with the 
target in the following test-trial. In the priming condition, when the inhibition of the 
valence of the distracter of the prime-trial is still active, responses to the target with the 
same valence should be delayed. The delayed reaction time toward the target is referred 
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to as the negative affective priming effect (Joormann, 2004), which reflects inhibition of 
affective information. Because the main function of the prime-trial is to manipulate the 
negative affective priming effect, only the reaction time toward the target in the test-trial 
is used in the following analyses. The negative affective priming effect is calculated by 
subtracting the reaction time toward the target in the control condition from the reaction 
time to the target in the priming condition. The higher value indicates stronger inhibition 
of affective information. If the shared valence in the priming condition is positive, the 
value represents inhibition of positive information (Inhibition-Positive); if the shared 
valence in the priming condition is negative, the value represents inhibition of negative 
information (Inhibition-Negative).  
 Working memory (WM). Working memory was measured with the backward 
word-span task. This task is modified from the backward digit span task, a standard test 
of short term memory (Baddeley, 1986), in which participants are instructed to repeat the 
number they heard in a reverse order. The length of the list represents their memory span. 
Similarly, in this backward word-span task, participants are asked to listen carefully to a 
series of words and then report back in a reverse order. For example, if the test administer 
says “fish-dog-cat”, the participant should reply “cat-dog-fish”. This task is a measure of 
working memory because participants need to keep the words in mind and reorder them 
backwards, which requires the storage, update, and manipulation of memory. Working 
memory is operationalized as the greatest number of words being correctly reported in 
the reverse order on two successive trials. A higher score indicates a higher capacity in 
working memory.  
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Because my research concerns valence-specific WM, each participant was tested 
in three versions of the WM task (neutral words, positive words, and negative words). To 
avoid the order effect, the research assistant administered these three versions in a 
random order. Three WM scores based on the valence of words were generated: WM for 
neutral information (WM-Neutral), WM for positive information (WM-Positive), and 
WM for negative information (WM-Negative).  
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Chapter Three: Results 
Manipulation Check: Sadness Induction  
First, to double check that the three sad films induced a moderate level of sadness 
in this sample, I examined sadness ratings for unmanipulated (watch) sad films: the first 
sad film for the entire sample (Group 1 and Group 2), the second sad film for Group 2, 
and the third sad film for Group 1. Mean sadness ratings were 6.37 (SD = 2.19) for the 
first sad film, 6.07 (SD = 2.35) for the second sad film, and 6.29 (SD = 2.21) for the third 
sad film. All three sad films induced significantly greater levels of sadness than the 
neutral film, MNeutral = 1.27, SD = .98; all ps < .01 (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
.0167 was applied to control for the possibility of a Type I error).  
Second, I examined whether the unmanipulated sadness ratings were similar 
across three sad films. Results showed that sadness ratings for the first sad film were not 
significantly different from sadness ratings for the second sad film, t(113) = .980 , p = 
.32, or the third sad film, t(124) = .601, p = .55; sadness ratings for the second sad film 
were also not significantly different from sadness ratings for the third sad film, t(237) = 
.707, p = .48 (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied).  
Third, I examined whether the three sad films induced a greater level of sadness 
than other types of negative emotions (i.e., anger, anxiety, and fear). Results indicated 
that each of the sad films induced greater sadness than anger, anxiety, and fear, all ps < 
.01 (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied).  
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Summary. This manipulation check showed that the three sad films A) induced a 
moderate level of sadness, B) induced similar levels of sadness, and C) induced a greater 
level of sadness than other types of negative emotions.  
Manipulation Check: Reappraisal Instruction  
To examine whether the reappraisal instruction increased positive emotions, I first 
conducted a repeated measure ANOVA with the discrete positive emotions reported in 
two film types  (baseline sad film vs. reappraisal film) as a within-subject variable and 
group membership (Group 1 vs. Group 2) as a between-subject variable. A consistent 
pattern emerged across two discrete positive emotions (happiness and optimism; see 
Figure 4a and Figure 4b). For happiness, a significant main effect of film type (baseline 
sad film vs. reappraisal film) was found, F(1, 247) = 352.62, p < .01, suggesting a higher 
level of happiness was reported in the reappraisal films than the baseline film. Neither the 
main effect for the group nor the interaction between film type and group were 
significant, F (1, 247) = 1.79, p = .19, F (1, 247) = 2.06, p = .15, respectively. Similarly, 
for optimism, a significant main effect of film type was found, F (1, 247) = 306.37, p < 
.01, suggesting a higher level of optimism was reported in the reappraisal films than the 
baseline sad film. Neither the main effect for the group nor the interaction between film 
type and group were significant, F (1, 247) = .00, p = .98, F (1, 247) = .34, p = .56, 
respectively. 
However, a slightly different pattern was revealed when I conducted a repeated 
measure ANOVA with the emotion of love as the dependent variable (see Figure 4c). The 
main effect for film type was significant, F(1, 247) = 281.50, p < .01, indicating a higher 
level of love was reported in the reappraisal films than the baseline sad film. However, 
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both the group main effect and the interaction between film type and group were 
significant, F(1, 247) = 4.05, p = .05, F(1, 247) = 9.25, p <.01, respectively. During the 
baseline sad film, the two groups did not differ in their ratings on the emotion of love 
(MGroup 1 = 1.79, MGroup 2 = 1.73), t(248) = .316, p = .75, but during the reappraisal films, 
Group 2 reported a higher level of love than Group 1 (MGroup 1 = 4.13, MGroup 2 = 5.10), 
t(247) = - 2.80, p < . 01. Although the results for the emotion of love were unexpected, 
participants overall reported a higher level of positive emotions in the reappraisal films 
than the baseline film, suggesting that they engaged in the positive reappraisal strategy to 
up-regulate positive emotions. 
Summary. This manipulation check about reappraisal instruction confirmed that 
higher levels of positive emotions (happiness, love, and optimism) were reported in the 
reappraisal films than the baseline sad film. 
Previous Experience with Films 
Because the emotion eliciting stimuli came from movie clips, some participants 
might have already seen some of the clips. To ensure that participants’ previous 
experience with films did not affect their emotion ratings, several independent t-tests 
were conducted (A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied).  
For both the baseline sad film and the reappraisal films, I used discrete positive 
emotion (happiness, love, and optimism) as the dependent variable and experience with 
the sad film as the grouping variable (0 = haven’t seen it before, 1 = have seen it before). 
No group differences for the baseline sad film were found in each positive emotion 
(happiness, love, and optimism), t(237) = -.91, p = .36, t(237) = -.56, p = .57, and t(237) 
= .12, p = .91, respectively. Similarly, no group differences for the reappraisal films were 
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found in each positive emotion (happiness, love, and optimism), t(237) = -.47, p = .64, 
t(237) = -.24, p = .02.  t(237) = -.47, p = .64, respectively.  
Summary. This analysis about previous experience with films confirmed that 
previous experience with the sad films did not influence participants’ ratings on positive 
emotions. 
Older Adult Sample Characteristics 
 To ensure that my older adult sample was not subject to dementia, I compared 
several key characteristics—mental health, cognitive functioning, and the perceived 
stress impact level—between the younger (age 18-36) and the older adult sample (age 56-
72).  
Mental health. Mental health was indicated by levels of depressive symptoms 
(indexed by the BDI score). To examine the mental health status between the younger 
and older adult samples, one independent groups t-test was conducted: The BDI score 
was entered as the dependent variable and the age group was entered as the grouping 
variable (0 = younger adults, 1= older adults). Results showed that younger (M = 8.84, 
SD = 9.38) and older adults (M = 10.81, SD = 9.89) do not differ in the severity of 
depressive symptoms, t(135) = -1.068, p = .29. In other words, my older adult sample 
showed an equivalent level of mental health as compared to my younger adult sample. 
Cognitive functioning. Cognitive functioning was represented by the verbal 
ability (indexed by the Shipley vocabulary score). To examine the cognitive functioning 
between the younger and older adult samples, one independent groups t-test was 
conducted: The Shipley vocabulary score was entered as the dependent variable and the 
age group was entered as the grouping variable (0 = younger adults, 1 = older adults). 
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Results showed that older adults (M = 35, SD = 3.37) have higher verbal ability than 
younger adults (M = 32, SD = 3.76), t(135) = -4.00, p = .000. In other words, my older 
adult sample showed equivalent or even higher levels of cognitive functioning than my 
younger adult sample.  
The perceived stress impact level. The perceived stress impact level was 
measured with the Life Experiences Survey (LES; Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). To 
examine the perceived stress impact level between the younger and older adult samples, 
one independent groups t-test was conducted: The sum score of the perceived stress 
impact level during the past six month was entered as the dependent variable and the age 
group was entered as the grouping variable (0 = younger adults, 1= older adults). Results 
showed that younger (M = 7.19, SD = 6.76) and older adults (M = 5.41, SD = 5.68) do not 
differ in the perceived stress impact level during the past six months, t(135) = -1.068, p = 
.29. In other words, my older adult sample showed an equivalent level of perceived stress 
impact level as my younger adult sample.  
Summary. My older adult sample showed levels of mental health, cognitive 
functioning, and the perceived stress impact level during the past six months that were 
comparable to those of the younger adult sample. Therefore, the possibility that my older 
adult sample has dementia can be ruled out.  
Descriptives 
Positive reappraisal ability. Positive reappraisal ability (PRA) was defined as 
the ability to increase positive emotions while receiving the instruction to reappraise in a 
positive way; thus, PRA was operationalized as ratings of positive emotions during the 
reappraisal films. I investigated three positive emotions and computed three PRA 
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measures: PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism. There are three reasons that 
I examined discrete PRA rather than forming a composite PRA score. First, each of these 
positive emotions carries a unique aspect of positive emotions beyond the shared variance 
in the positive core affect. Examining discrete PRA allows opportunities to explore the 
unique nature of each positive emotion that is generated based on positive reappraisal, 
and to examine if any PRA might rely more on valence-specific EF than the other(s). 
Second, examining discrete PRA rather than the PRA composite avoids a possible error 
that the significant results of one PRA go undetected because three types of PRA are 
collapsed. Third, the inter-item reliability for the PRA composite score is too low to 
suggest this is one coherent construct (Cronbach’s α = 0.6). Because not all participants 
reappraised the same film, to make PRA comparable across films, I z-scored PRA.  
Emotion reactivity. Emotion reactivity (ER) was defined as the initial emotion 
response toward an emotion-eliciting event; thus, ER was operationalized as the ratings 
of positive emotions at the baseline sad film (which is the unregulated sad film). Similar 
to the PRA measures, I investigated three discrete positive emotions and calculated each 
reactivity score: ER-Happiness, ER-Love, and ER-Optimism. Each reactivity score was 
also z-scored so that they were on the same scale as PRA.  
Table 3 shows the mean, standard deviation, and the inter-correlation between ER 
and PRA for the entire sample and by age group. 
Executive function (EF). I measured two subcomponents of EF: inhibition and 
WM, each of which was measured with valence-specific materials (neutral, positive, and 
negative). This resulted in six EF scores. For inhibition, three measures were computed: 
inhibition of neutral information (Inhibition-Neutral), inhibition of positive information 
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(Inhibition-Positive), and inhibition of negative information (Inhibition-Negative). For 
WM, three measures were computed: WM for neutral information (WM-neutral), WM 
for positive information (WM-positive), WM for negative information (WM-negative). 
Table 4 shows the mean, standard deviation, and inter-correlation among these EF 
variables for the entire sample and by age group. 
Question 1: Does Valence-specific EF Correlate with PRA?  
 Inhibition and PRA. I predicted that Inhibition-Negative correlates with PRA, 
but that Inhibition-Neutral and Inhibition-Positive do not. I conducted three hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses to test this hypothesis and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level 
of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable; emotion 
reactivity (ER) of the same emotion as PRA was entered as the predictor variable in the 
first step and inhibition of valence-specific information was entered as the predictor in 
the second step. Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were 
examined in three separate regression models.  
Contrary to my prediction, Inhibition-Negative was not correlated with three 
types of PRA, all ps >.05 (see Table 5.3). As predicted, no association between 
Inhibition-Neutral and PRA was found, all ps >.05 (see Table 5.1); no association 
between Inhibition-Positive and PRA was found, all ps > .05 (see Table 5.2).  
 WM and PRA. I predicted that WM-Positive positively correlates with PRA, but 
WM-Neutral and WM-Negative do not. I conducted three hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses to test this hypothesis and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 
was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER for the same emotion 
of PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step and the valence-specific WM was 
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entered as the predictor in the second step. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-
Negative were examined in three separate regression models.  
Contrary to my prediction, WM-Positive was not associated with three types of 
PRA, all ps >.05 (see Table 6.2). As predicted, no association between WM-Neutral and 
PRA was found, all ps >.05 (see Table 6.1); no association between WM-Negative and 
PRA was found either, all ps > .05 (see Table 6.3).  
Secondary analyses 1– nonlinear relationships. The main analyses indicated no 
linear relationship between valence-specific EF and PRA; however, it is possible that the 
relationships are not linear. Thus, I conducted secondary analyses to explore the 
possibility of curvilinear relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA. 
Specifically, I examined the quadratic relationships between valence-specific EF and 
PRA because it is possible that as valence-specific EF increases to a level that supports 
the highest level of PRA, the increase in PRA may level off.   
 Inhibition and PRA. To examine the quadratic relationships between PRA and 
inhibition, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent 
variable. ER of the same emotion as PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step; 
inhibition of valence-specific information was entered as the predictor in the second step; 
inhibition squared was entered as the predictor in the third step. Inhibition-Neutral, 
Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were examined in three separate regression 
models. Results showed no association between inhibition of valence-specific 
information and PRA all ps > .05 (see Table 7.1-7.3). 
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WM and PRA. To examine the quadratic relationships between PRA and WM, I 
conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable. ER of the 
same emotion as PRA was entered as the predictor variable in the first step; WM for 
valence-specific information was entered as the predictor in the second step; WM squared 
was entered as the predictor in the third step. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-
Negative were examined in three separate regression models. Results showed no 
association between WM for valence-specific information and PRA all ps > .05 (see 
Table 8.1-8.3). 
Secondary analyses 2– extreme groups approach. The analyses so far have 
shown that no linear or curvilinear relationship exists between valence-specific EF and 
PRA. The next analytic strategy was to sample extreme values of valence-specific EF. 
This methodology is called extreme groups approach (EGA). This is not a redundant step 
after curvilinear regression analyses because EGA captures extreme scores whereas 
curvilinear regression analysis concerns the shape of the relationships of two variables. 
EGA has been widely used in studies that investigate EF in college students to ensure that 
the lower end of the EF distribution was not under represented (e.g., Schmeichel et al., 
2008) and to enhance statistical power (Kelly, 1939). In the current study, ninety-three 
percent of the participants had an education level equal to or higher than the associate 
degree or partial college. It is possible that the lower extreme values of the EF were under 
represented in the sample. In other words, sampling from the extremes ensures that the 
key variables in my hypothesis were adequately sampled, as suggested by Schmeichel et 
al. (2008). However, I have to note that the use of EGA could inflate the magnitude of a 
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relationship (Preacher, Rucker, MacCullum, & Nicewander, 2005) and the results need to 
be interpreted with caution.  
Inhibition and PRA. To examine the relationships between PRA and inhibition of 
valence-specific information by EGA, I conducted three independent groups t tests and a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Three types of standardized PRA 
residuals (controlling for the variance from the corresponding emotion reactivity) were 
entered as test variables and two extreme groups (high vs. low; individuals who scored 
higher than 1 SD above the mean on inhibition scores belong to the high extreme group, 
and individuals who scored lower than 1 SD below the mean on inhibition scores belong 
to the low extreme group) were entered as the grouping variable. Inhibition-Neutral, 
Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were examined in three separate sets of t 
tests. 
Results showed that individuals with the extreme inhibition scores do not differ 
on PRA. For Inhibition-Negative, group differences on PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and 
PRA-Optimism were not significant, all ps > .05; similarly for Inhibition-Positive and 
Inhibition-Neutral, group differences on PRA were not significant, all ps > .05. Overall, 
the results in EGA revealed the same non-significant relationship as in regression 
analyses such that inhibition of valence-specific information did not correlate with PRA.  
WM and PRA. To examine the relationships between PRA and WM for valence-
specific information by EGA, I conducted three independent groups t tests and a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Three types of standardized PRA 
residuals (controlling for the variance from the corresponding ER) were entered as test 
variables and two extreme groups (high vs. low; individuals who scored higher than 1 SD 
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above the mean on WM scores belong to the high extreme group, and individuals who 
scored lower than 1 SD below the mean on WM scores belong to the low extreme group) 
were entered as the grouping variable. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-Negative 
were examined in three separate sets of t tests. 
Results showed that individuals with the extreme WM scores do not differ on 
PRA. For WM-Positive, group differences on PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-
Optimism were not significant, all ps > .05; similarly for WM-Neutral and WM-
Negative, group differences on PRA were not significant, all ps > .05. Overall, the results 
in EGA revealed the same non-significant relationship as in regression analyses, such that 
WM for valence-specific information did not correlate with PRA. 
Summary. I examined Question one (the relationships between valence-specific 
EF and PRA) by employing three statistical methods (linear regression analysis, 
curvilinear regression analysis, and extreme groups analysis). Three methods have 
yielded similar results. Contrary to my prediction, PRA was not associated with 
Inhibition-Negative or WM-Positive, either in a linear or quadratic way.  
Question 2.1: Does PRA Increase with Age? 
 To investigate the developmental trajectory of PRA across adulthood, I 
conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the 
same emotion of PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step and age was entered as 
the predictor in the second step. PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism were 
examined in three separate regression models.  
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Results indicated that the age effect on PRA-Love was significant, B = .012, p = 
.01. In contrast, the effects of age on PRA-Happiness and on PRA-Optimism were both 
not significant, B = -.002, p = .71 and B = .001, p = .90. In summary, the reappraisal 
ability to increase the emotion of love increased with age, but not the reappraisal ability 
to increase the emotions of happiness and optimism.  
Secondary analyses—nonlinear relationships. The main analyses indicated 
PRA-Love was positively associated with age, but no association between age and PRA-
Happiness or PRA-Optimism was found; however, it is possible that these relationships 
are not linear. Thus, I conducted secondary analyses to explore the possibility of 
curvilinear relationships between PRA and age. Specifically, I examined the quadratic 
relationships between PRA and age because Carstensen et al. (2000) suggested that there 
is a trending quadratic relationship between age and emotion regulation.  
To investigate the quadratic relationships between age and PRA, I conducted 
three hierarchical multiple regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
.0167 was applied. Each PRA was entered as the dependent variable. ER of the same 
emotion of PRA was entered as the predictor in the first step, age (centered) was entered 
as the predictor in the second step, and age squared was entered as the predictor in the 
third step. PRA-Happiness, PRA-Love, and PRA-Optimism were examined in three 
separate regression models.  
Results indicated that for PRA-Happiness, the effects of age and age squared were 
both not significant, B = -.002, p = .66, and B = .000, p = .96. For PRA-Love, the effect 
of age was significant, B = .012, p = .01, but the effect of age squared was not significant, 
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B = .002, p = .68. For PRA-Optimism, the effects of age and age squared were both not 
significant, B = .000, p = .93 and B = .000, p = .90. 
Summary. PRA-Love was positively associated with age in a linear way, but not 
in a quadratic way. PRA-Happiness and PRA-Optimism were not associated with age, 
either in a linear or a quadratic way. 
Question 2.2: Does Valence-specific EF Change with Age? 
 To examine the developmental trajectory of valence-specific EF, I conducted a 
series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses using age as the predictor for valence-
specific EF.  
Inhibition and age. To examine the relationships between inhibition of valence-
specific information and age, inhibition of valence-specific information was entered as 
the dependent variable and age was entered as the predictor. Inhibition-Neutral, 
Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were examined in three separate regression 
models. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied.  
Consistent with my prediction, age was not associated with Inhibition-Neutral, B 
= -1.438, p = .52. However, contrary to my prediction, age was not associated with 
Inhibition-Positive or Inhibition-Negative, B = .833, p = .74 and B = 3.798, p = .11. In 
summary, Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative remained 
constant across adulthood.  
WM and age. To examine the relationships between WM for valence-specific 
information and age, WM for valence-specific information was entered as the dependent 
variable and age was entered as the predictor. WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-
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Negative were examined in three separate regression models. A Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha level of .0167 was applied 
 Contrary to my prediction, age was not associated with WM-Neutral, WM-
Positive, or WM-Negative, B = -.207, p = .022, B = -.134, p = .205, and B = -.023, p = 
.792. In summary, WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-Negative remained constant 
across adulthood.  
Secondary analyses—nonlinear relationships. The main analyses indicated no 
linear relationships between valence-specific EF and age. It is possible that the 
relationships are not linear. Thus, I conducted secondary analysis to explore curvilinear 
relationships between valence-specific EF and age. Specifically, I examined the quadratic 
relationships between valence-specific EF and age because the PFC has been documented 
to fully mature close to the age of 30, and thus EF—the PFC-based cognitive function—
could increase in early adulthood and then level off later sometime after the mid-
adulthood.  
Inhibition and age. To examine the quadratic relationships between inhibition of 
valence-specific information and age, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Inhibition of 
valence-specific information was entered as the dependent variable; age (z-score) was 
entered as the predictor in the first step and age squared was entered as the predictor in 
the second step. Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-Positive, and Inhibition-Negative were 
examined in three separate regression models.  
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Results showed that age and age squared both were not associated Inhibition-
Neutral, B = -1.438, p = .517, B = 5.458, p = .049, Inhibition-Positive, B = .833, p = .742, 
B = .457, p = .860, or Inhibition-Negative, B = 3.798, p = .109, B = -1.871, p = .441.  
WM and age. To examine the quadratic relationships between WM for valence-
specific information and age, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression analyses 
and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. WM for valence-specific 
information was entered as the dependent variable; age (z-score) was entered as the 
predictor in the first step and age squared was entered as the predictor in the second step. 
WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, and WM-Negative were examined in three separate 
regression models.  
Results showed that age and age squared were not associated with WM-Neutral 
information, B = -.134, p = .205, B = -.232, p = .036, WM-Positive, B = -.207, p = .022, B 
= -.120, p = .201, or WM-Negative, B = -.023, p = .792, B = -.137, p = .134.  
Summary. Both inhibition of valence-specific information and WM for valence-
specific information were not associated with age, either in a linear or quadratic way. 
These findings suggest that valence-specific EF remains constant across adulthood.  
Question 2.3: Do the Relationships between Inhibition of Valence-specific 
Information and PRA Change across Adulthood? 
In this section, results are presented in the order of Inhibition-Neutral, Inhibition-
Positive, and Inhibition-Negative.  
Inhibition-Neutral. To examine whether the relationships between inhibition-
Neutral and PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each 
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PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was 
entered as the predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and Inhibition-Neutral (z-score) 
were entered as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and 
Inhibition-neutral was entered as the predictor in the third step. PRA-Happiness, PRA-
Love, and PRA-Optimism were examined in three separate regression models. 
Both the main effect of age and the main effect of Inhibition-Positive were not 
significant, all ps > .02 and all ps > .14. The interaction effect of age and Inhibition-
Neutral was not significant for the three types of PRA, all ps > .161. In summary, the 
relationships between Inhibition-Neutral and PRA remained constant (non-significant) 
across adulthood (see Table 9.1). 
Inhibition-Positive. To examine whether the relationships between Inhibition-
Positive and PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each 
PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was 
entered as the predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and the Inhibition-Positive (z-score) 
were entered as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and 
Inhibition-Positive was entered as the predictor in the third step.  
Both the main effect of age and the main effect of Inhibition-Positive were not 
significant, all ps > .02 and all ps > .60. The interaction effect of age and Inhibition-
Positive was not significant for the three types of PRA, all ps > .30. In summary, the 
relationships between Inhibition-Positive and PRA remained constant (non-significant) 
across adulthood (see Table 9.2). 
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Inhibition-Negative. To examine whether the relationships between Inhibition-
Negative and PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each 
PRA was entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was 
entered as the predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and the Inhibition-Negative (z-
score) were entered as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and 
Inhibition-Negative was entered as the predictor in the third step.  
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .167, p = 
.014. The main effect of Inhibition-Negative was not significant, all ps > .56. The 
interaction effect of age and Inhibition-Negative was significant for the three types of 
PRA, all Bs > .168, ps < .01. In other words, the relationships between Inhibition-
Negative and PRA vary as a function of age (see Table 9.3). 
To further examine the interaction effect of age and Inhibition-Negative on PRA, 
the relationships were plotted, following the procedure suggested by Aiken and West 
(1991). The interaction is shown in Figure 5a, 5b and 5c. Simple slopes analyses were 
performed to test that A) the slopes of the simple regression line for each age value (1 SD 
below the age mean as the younger adult group, the age mean as the middle-aged adult 
group, and 1 SD above the age mean as the older adult group) were significantly different 
from zero, and B) the slope for the older adult group was different from the slope for the 
younger adult group (Aiken & West, 1991).  
For PRA-Happiness, simple slope analyses revealed that the effect of Inhibition-
Negative in older adults was marginally greater than zero, B = .166, t(244) = 1.856, p = 
.064; the effect of Inhibition-Negative in middle age adults was not different from zero, B 
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= -.002, t(244) = -.032, p = .97; the effect of Inhibition-Negative in younger adults was 
marginally smaller than zero, B = -.170, t(244) = -1.901, p = .058. In addition, the slope 
for older adults was different from the slope for younger adults, t(244) = 8.40, p < .001. 
In summary, for older adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was associated with a 
higher level of PRA-Happiness; in contrast, for younger adults, a higher level of 
Inhibition-Negative was associated with a lower level of PRA-Happiness (see Figure 5a).  
For PRA-Love, simple slope analyses revealed that the effect of Inhibition-
Negative in older adults was greater than zero, B = .178, t(244) = 1.990, p = .05; the 
effect of Inhibition-Negative in middle age adults was not different from zero, B = -.004, 
t(244) = -.063, p = .95; the effect of Inhibition-Negative in younger adults was smaller 
than zero, B = - .186, t(244) = - 2.079, p = .03. In addition, the slope for older adults was 
different from the slope for younger adults, t(244) = 9.10, p < .001. In summary, for 
older adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was associated with a higher level of 
PRA-Love; in contrast, for younger adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was 
associated with a lower level of PRA-Love (see Figure 5b).  
Similarly, for PRA-Optimism, simple slope analyses revealed that the effect of 
Inhibition-Negative in older adults was marginally greater than zero, B = .145, t(240) = 
1.872, p = .06, the effect of Inhibition-Negative in middle age adults was not different 
from zero, B = -.036, t(240) = -.057, p = .57, and the effect of Inhibition-Negative in 
younger adults was smaller than zero, B = - .217, t(240) = - 2.079, p = .03. In addition, 
the slope for older adults was different from the slope for younger adults, t(244) = 9.05, p 
< .001. In summary, for older adults, a higher level of Inhibition-Negative was associated 
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with a higher level of PRA-Optimism; in contrast, for younger adults, a higher level of 
Inhibition-Negative was associated with a lower level of PRA-Optimism (see Figure 5c).  
Summary. The relationships between Inhibition-Negative and PRA varied as a 
function of age. For older adults, Inhibition-Negative was positively associated with 
PRA; for younger adults, Inhibition-Negative was negatively associated with PRA. 
Regarding Inhibition-Neutral and Inhibition-Positive, their relationships with PRA 
remained non-significant across adulthood.  
Question 2.4: Do the Relationships between WM for Valence-specific Information 
and PRA Change across Adulthood? 
In this section, results are presented in the order of WM-Neutral, WM-Positive, 
and WM-Negative.  
 WM-Neutral. To examine whether the relationships between WM-Neutral and 
PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was 
entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was entered as a 
predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and WM-Neutral (z-score) were entered as 
predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and WM-Neutral was 
entered as the predictor in the third step.  
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .164, p < 
.01. The main effect of WM-Neutral was also not significant, all ps > .084. The 
interaction effect of age and WM-Neutral was not significant for all three types of PRA, 
all ps > .128. In summary, the relationships between WM-Neutral and PRA remained 
constant (non-significant) across adulthood (see Table 10.1). 
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WM-Positive. To examine whether the relationships between WM-Positive and 
PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was 
entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was entered as a 
predictor in the first step, age (z-score) and WM-Positive (z-score) were entered as 
predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and WM-Positive was 
entered as a predictor in the third step.  
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .161, p = 
.01. The main effect of WM-Positive was also not significant, all ps > .255. The 
interaction effect of age and WM-Positive was not significant across all three types of 
PRA, all ps > .343. In summary, the relationships between WM-Positive and PRA 
remained constant (non-significant) across adulthood (see Table 10.2). 
WM-Negative. To examine whether the relationships between WM-Negative and 
PRA change across adulthood, I conducted three hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses and a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .0167 was applied. Each PRA was 
entered as the dependent variable; ER of the same emotion as the PRA was entered as a 
predictor variable in the first step, age (z-score) and WM-Negative (z-score) were entered 
as predictors in the second step, and the interaction term of age and WM-Negative was 
entered as the predictor in the third step.  
The main effect of age was not significant, except for PRA-Love, B = .174, p = 
.006. The main effect of WM-Negative was not significant, all ps > .185. The interaction 
effect of age and WM-Negative was not significant across all three types of PRA, all ps > 
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.531. In summary, the relationships between WM-Negative and PRA remained constant 
(non-significant) across adulthood (see Table 10.3).   
Summary. The relationships between WM for valence-specific information and 
PRA did not change across adulthood. In other words, they remained constant (non-
significant) across adulthood.  
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
 The overall goal of this study was to examine the role of two subcomponents of 
EF in the ability to up-regulate positive emotions after reappraisal. The first part of this 
research examined the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA. I proposed 
that based on a dual-process model, positive reappraisal involves inhibiting negative 
information as well as maintaining, updating, and manipulating positive information. 
Thus, I predicted that both inhibition of negative information and WM for positive 
information are positively associated with PRA, but other types of valence-specific EF 
are not. The second part of this research examined the relationships between valence-
specific EF and PRA while considering age as a moderator. Previous studies have 
documented decline in cognitive function but well-preserved emotional function in old 
age. Thus, I predicted that the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA change 
over the course of adulthood. Specifically, the relationships between inhibition of 
negative information and PRA increase with age, while the relationships between WM 
for positive information and PRA decrease with age.  
I. Valence-specific Executive Function and Positive Reappraisal Ability 
Inhibition and PRA. Regarding how inhibition of valence-specific information 
contributes to PRA, the results differed from what was predicted: Inhibition of negative 
information is not associated with PRA, either in a linear or curvilinear relationship. I 
discuss in the following what might have contributed to this non-significant association.  
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Negative affective priming task. Concerning the measure of inhibition, it is 
possible that the negative affective priming task inefficiently measures the multifaceted 
nature of inhibition ability (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). This type of inhibition, identified 
by the negative affective priming effect, is only one aspect of inhibition, and thus might 
not fully capture or reflect the complex inhibitory mechanisms involved in positive 
reappraisal. In addition, on a neuroanatomical level, the negative priming effect has been 
suggested to operate mostly in the posterior cortex and the ventral or occipital-temporal 
visual pathway (the “what” pathway), rather than the prefrontal cortex (Connelly & 
Hasher, 1993). That is, the negative priming effect might not reflect the PFC-based 
inhibition process, which is activated during reappraisal and is expected to support PRA 
directly (Ochsner, 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). 
However, previous studies have shown that inhibition of negative information, 
identified by the negative affective priming effect, plays an important role in emotion 
regulation. The reduced negative affective priming effect for negative materials is related 
to increased rumination in depressive patients (Joormann, 2004, 2006) and the decreased 
use of reappraisal in daily life (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Although no association 
between inhibition of negative information (measured by the negative affective priming 
task) and PRA was found, I do not completely rule out the possibility that inhibition of 
negative information is engaged during positive reappraisal. 
I argue that this specific type of inhibition, identified by the negative affective 
priming effect, is necessary in the process of positive reappraisal. Given that A) this type 
of inhibition reflects how successful individuals are able to suppress unwanted 
information that is supposed to be ignored, and B) deficits in this type of inhibition result 
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in prolonged processing of unwanted information in WM, a process that exacerbates 
rumination on negative thoughts (Joormann & Siemer, 2011), then C) when inhibiting the 
unwanted, to-be-ignored negative information is successful, negative information is less 
likely to enter or occupy WM for further processing (Joormann, 2004), which is the 
critical process of positive reappraisal. In other words, when inhibition of negative 
information is successful, WM is made available to store and process positive 
information, which allows individuals the opportunity to generate positive 
reinterpretation. 
In addition to inhibition, attention switching might be another cognitive ability 
that is examined in the negative affective priming task. Given that this negative affective 
priming task requires participants to disengage from the previous prime trial and quickly 
engage in the current test trial, a high level of inhibition (a longer delay between the 
prime and the test trial) might in fact reflect difficulties in disengaging attention from the 
previous priming trial and attending to the subsequent test trial (i.e., high switching 
costs). On the other hand, a low level of inhibition (a short delay or no delay between 
trials) might reflect better attention switching between trials (i.e., low switching costs).  
Regarding how attention switching might be involved in the process of positive 
reappraisal, I propose two possibilities, which are as follows: First, high switching costs 
are typically interpreted as less skilled performance, and thus imply that the person who 
has high switching costs experiences greater difficulties in both diverting attention away 
from irrelevant information and attending to relevant information in the process of 
reappraisal. Second, high switching costs might in fact reflect a more cautious and 
detailed oriented strategy in information processing, in which attention is devoted to the 
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details of information. In the process of positive reappraisal, the person with higher 
switching costs may process or evaluate each piece of information carefully before 
moving on to the next. Evidence from a recent study seems to support the second 
possibility. McRae et al. (2011) found that high switching costs (longer response time in 
switching between the global vs. local cues) were associated with better ability to 
reappraise. In addition, they found that high switching costs were associated with high 
accuracy rates in the switching task. Thus, it is possible that these participants prioritized 
accuracy over speed when implementing reappraisal strategies in emotion regulation.  
Last, I propose that this specific type of inhibition, identified by the negative 
affective priming effect, might work in conjunction with other subtypes of inhibition. For 
example, the well-known prepotent response inhibition (measured by the emotional 
Stroop task) might be used to support the complex inhibition processes involved in 
positive reappraisal. Prepotent response inhibition refers to the ability to override habitual 
responses to the most noticeable but goal-irrelevant information, such as the ability to 
suppress the impulse to process the semantic meaning of a negative word when the task 
goal is to read the color of the negative word. In the process of positive reappraisal, 
prepotent response inhibition may allow attention to be re-directed from the goal-
irrelevant negative information toward goal-relevant positive information. Therefore, 
individuals do not perseverate on goal-irrelevant negative information, but direct their 
attention toward positive information to generate positive thoughts to reappraise. In 
summary, the type of inhibition, identified by the negative affective priming effect, and 
prepotent response inhibition might work together in the complex process of positive 
reappraisal to inhibit negative information and to enhance the accessibility and 
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processing of positive information. This proposal will need to be examined carefully in 
future studies. Overall, even though the association between inhibition of negative 
information and PRA was not found, this study provides a valuable insight toward the 
complex inhibitory processes involved in positive reappraisal. 
WM Memory and PRA. Regarding how WM for valence-specific information 
contributes to PRA, the results differed from what was predicted: WM for positive 
information did not contribute to PRA, either in a linear or curvilinear relationship. The 
following paragraphs discuss what might have contributed to this non-significant 
association. 
Backward word span task. Concerning the measure of WM, it is possible that the 
demand of WM in the backward word span task does not equal the demand of WM 
required in positive reappraisal. It is important to note that WM is composed of multiple 
subsystems, including the central executive and three storage subsystems—the 
phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, and episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000, 2001). 
To successfully reappraise, individuals need to engage the central executive system and 
at least one storage subsystem. However, the backward word span task might not involve 
the central executive subsystem to the same extent as other WM tasks. Some researchers 
have proposed that the backward word span task relies mostly on the phonological loop 
for storage and reordering (Conway et al., 2005). They argue that even though the task 
requirement that goes beyond mere storage, the requirement of reordering words is not 
enough to engage the central executive system to turn this task into a WM task (Cantor, 
Engle, & Hamilton, 1991). This could be due to the very brief time allowed for 
information processing in the backward word span task so that the processing is not 
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brought online as it is in other WM tasks (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). Consistent with 
this argument, a factor analysis showed that the backward word span task loaded on a 
different factor from other WM span tasks (e.g., Operation span, Reading span) that 
involve dual processes—the central executive and one other storage subsystem; instead, 
the backward word span task loaded on the same factor as short-term memory tasks that 
only involve storage (e.g., forward digit span tasks) (Engle et al., 1999).  
However, I think using the backward word span task to investigate the underlying 
cognitive processes in reappraisal still makes sense on a theoretical level because the 
process of retrieving and manipulating valence-specific information in the backward 
word span task mirrors the process of positive reappraisal. They both involve storing, 
manipulating, and updating valence-specific information. I believe that increasing the 
difficulty level of the backward word span task would make the WM demand in the task 
more similar to the WM demand in positive reappraisal. One way to adjust the task 
difficulty is to require individuals to recite emotional words in alphabetical rather than 
reverse order. This adjustment borrows the task design from another WM task, the alpha 
span task, which requires generating a list of letters by reordering the first letter of a 
string of words in alphabetical order (Craik, 1986). Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, 
and Wittmann (2000) compared the alpha span task to the backward digit span task. They 
suggested that the alpha span task required mental representations of all of the words in 
the list and their mutual relationship to each other based on their alphabetical order, 
whereas the backward digit span task only required mental representations of two 
adjacent digits and the relative relationships between them. In summary, the WM demand 
of the backward word span task might need to be adjusted to a level more equivalent to 
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that of the WM demand of positive reappraisal to increase the likelihood of finding 
significant correlations between WM and PRA. 
Valence-specific EF and PRA. Overall, the first part of the research 
demonstrated that two subcomponents of valence-specific EF do not contribute to PRA. 
The null results might be taken as evidence for the possibility that reappraisal simply 
does not demand a great deal of cognitive resources, and thus the role of EF in PRA is 
minimal. This argument is based on previous evidence showing that reappraisal preserves 
more cognitive resources than suppression, and so individuals who use reappraisal to 
regulate emotions perform better in subsequent cognitive tasks (Richards & Gross, 2000). 
This argument seems fair, but might require reevaluation. I propose the reason that 
reappraisal does not deplete cognitive resources is because of early engagement of the 
strategy, not because of a lack of need for cognitive control. Reappraisal is an antecedent-
focused emotion regulation strategy, as opposed to suppression, which is a response-
focused emotion regulation strategy (Gross, 1998). Individuals need to exert executive 
control during reappraisal in order to regulate their emotions. For example, Ochsner 
(2005) found overlapping brain regions between reappraisal and EF; Schmeichel et al. 
(2008) found a positive association between WM and reappraisal. Both pieces of 
evidence support the notion that reappraisal involves high-level cognitive processes.  
In line with this argument, emerging evidence demonstrates the role of executive 
control over valence-specific materials in reappraisal. Malooly, Genet, and Siemer (2012) 
demonstrated that affective flexibility, measured by a modified switching paradigm, is 
closely related to individuals’ ability to down-regulate the emotion of sadness in 
reappraisal. The modified switching paradigm could potentially involve both inhibition 
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and WM because participants need to remember and alternate between two sets of rules 
by bringing the task-relevant rule online while suppressing the task-irrelevant one and 
updating rules when necessary. Results showed that participants who are better at 
attending to goal-relevant neutral information and disengaging from the goal-irrelevant 
negative context experience a lower level of sadness while reappraising a sad film.  
Similar to my current study, Malooly et al. (2012) investigated the role of 
valence-specific EF beyond general EF (neutral materials) in reappraisal. We both 
recognized the contributions of high-level cognitive processes to reappraisal, as indicated 
in previous work, and further examined the role of valence-specific EF in reappraisal. 
However, we took different approaches to investigating the cognitive aspect of 
reappraisal. These different characteristics and designs between our studies may help 
explain the discrepancy in findings.  
First, I examined similar but different cognitive processes: I investigated two 
subcomponents of valence-specific EF (inhibition of negative information and WM for 
positive information) based on a dual-process model, while Malooly et al. (2012) focused 
on affective flexibility based on a similar rationale that reappraisal involves the flexible 
executive control over emotional materials. Their task could potentially measure 
inhibition and WM at the same time and thus better capture the complex nature of 
executive control ability that is involved in reappraisal, leading to a significant 
association with reappraisal effectiveness.  
Second, in the sad context, I measured the up-regulation of positive emotions 
rather than the down-regulation of negative emotions. Positive and negative emotions 
have been suggested to be orthogonal constructs (Russell, 2003). That is, positive 
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emotions can coexist with negative emotions and can work independently from negative 
emotions; feeling negative emotions does not exclude individuals from experiencing 
positive emotions. An example of the coexistence of positive and negative emotions can 
be seen in Folkman (1997), in which caregivers/partners of AIDS patients reported 
positive emotions along with negative emotions during the course of caregiving and 
bereavement, and the level of their positive emotions was comparable to a college sample 
that did not experience unusual stress. Similarly, the reappraisal ability to up-regulate 
positive emotions and the reappraisal ability to down-regulate negative emotions do not 
have to travel synchronously. For example, in my study, the ability to increase the 
emotion of optimism was not associated with the ability to decrease the emotion of 
sadness. 
In a negative context, however, negative emotions are more salient than positive 
emotions, and there is more room for negative emotions to be down-regulated than for 
positive emotions to be up-regulated. In other words, there is a ceiling effect in terms of 
the amount that positive emotions can be elevated by positive reappraisal. This idea is 
supported by our data. For example, the average level of happiness reported in positive 
reappraisal was fairly low and very little variance was shown. Obviously, it is unlikely to 
get a significant association between one variable with a limited variance (PRA-
Happiness) and another variable with a widespread variance that is normally distributed 
(my EF measures), as is the case in my study. 
Third, the other difference between my study and Malooly et al. (2012) is the type 
of emotional materials being processed in EF tasks. I used emotional words in the EF 
tasks, whereas Malooly et al. used emotion-eliciting pictures (International Affective 
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Picture Set) in their EF task. Cognitive processes on emotional information in pictures 
seem to be more parallel to those involved in reappraisal, compared to cognitive 
processes on emotional words. This could be why Malooly et al. found a significant 
association between valence-specific EF and reappraisal while I failed to do so. In 
summary, the similarity between the types of emotional materials processed in EF and in 
reappraisal could potentially influence the degree to which these two processes correlate 
with each other.    
II. Valence-specific Executive Function and Positive Reappraisal Ability across 
Adulthood 
The second part of this research aimed to investigate whether the relationships 
between valence-specific EF and PRA change across adulthood. Major findings are 
discussed in the following three sections.  
Age and PRA. I examined the developmental trajectory of PRA across 
adulthood. Based on the socio-emotional selective theory, older adults are motivated to 
preserve emotional well-being and are thought to have stronger emotion regulation 
abilities in achieving emotionally meaningful goals (Carstensen et al., 1999), particularly 
when positive reappraisal is used (Shiota & Levenson, 2009). Therefore, I predicted that 
PRA increases with age.  
Among three types of PRA investigated in this study, the ability to increase the 
emotion of love (PRA-Love) was found to increase with age, but not the ability to 
increase the emotions of happiness and optimism (PRA-Happiness and PRA-Optimism). 
The exclusive age effect on PRA-Love implies that not all positive emotions are desired 
equally in old age. In this case, the emotion of love contains a unique social component 
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that is not shared by the other two types of positive emotions. The increased ability to up-
regulate the emotion of love in old age suggests that older adults desire to stay socially 
connected and engaged, even when they are in a stressful or sad situation. This idea is 
consistent with the socio-emotional selective theory, which emphasizes older adults’ 
desire for emotionally meaningful goals (Carstensen et al., 2003). Thus, it makes sense 
that older adults have better abilities to up-regulate discrete positive emotion (love), 
rather than a broad spectrum of positive emotions. In contrast, the emotions of happiness 
and optimism do not appear to involve this social component. The emotion of happiness 
describes a general state of positive affect within an individual and the emotion of 
optimism carries expectations of improvement or projections into the future, which is not 
compatible with older adults’ immediate emotional goals. Thus, the lack of a social 
component may be the reason that the age effect was not found in the ability to up-
regulate happiness and optimism.   
Age and valence-specific EF.  I examined the developmental trajectory of 
valence-specific EF over the course of adulthood. No age difference in valence-specific 
EF was found.  
Inhibition and age. Inhibition of neutral information remained constant across 
adulthood as predicted; however, contrary to my hypotheses, inhibition of negative 
information was not found to decrease with age and inhibition of positive information 
was not found to increase with age. The absence of age difference in inhibition of 
valence-specific information might be due to two reasons. First, the negative affective 
priming task does not depend on the PFC but the posterior cortex and the ventral or 
occipital-temporal visual pathway instead (Connelly & Hasher, 1993). These cortical 
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regions do not decline with age as rapidly as the PFC. Therefore, inhibition of valence-
specific information, measured by the negative affective priming task, was not found to 
change with age. Second, the negative affective priming task in my study instructed 
participants to evaluate the valence of the information (valence evaluation) rather than to 
evaluate whether these emotional words described themselves (self-reference evaluation). 
Previous studies have suggested that self-reference evaluation is the key component in 
detecting the impairment or decline in inhibition of valence-specific information (Segal, 
1988; Joormann, 2004). Thus, it is possible that valence evaluation used in my study was 
not sensitive enough to detect the age difference in inhibition of valence-specific 
information. In summary, the negative affective priming task is not based on the age 
sensitive PFC and does not involve self-reference evaluation. Both features of the task 
may contribute to the non-significant relationship between age and inhibition of valence-
specific information.  
 WM and age. Contrary to my hypotheses, WM for neutral, positive, and negative 
information were not found to decline with age. This could be because the WM measure, 
the backward word span task, does not demand cognitive resources in processing (update 
and manipulation) to the extent that most other WM tasks do (e.g., the operation span). 
Specifically, the demand on the central executives, which is the key feature of processing, 
is only minimal in the backward word span task (Engle et al., 1999). Therefore, it is 
possible that the age-related decline in WM (mostly the central executives) was not 
captured by the backward word span task in my study. Furthermore, Bopp and 
Verhaeghen (2005) have concluded that the size of the decline in backward word span 
task is smaller than that in other WM tasks. Therefore, even if there was an age-related 
 	   81 
decline in WM in my study, it is possible that the decline would have been too small to 
be detected by the backward word span task. Considering that my older adult sample was 
relatively small, it is probable that the statistical power was too low to detect the 
relationships between age and WM for valence-specific information.  
The relationships between PRA and valence-specific EF across age. I 
investigated the relationships between inhibition of negative information and PRA as a 
function of age. Older adults are highly motivated to work on their emotional goals, and 
yet, with declining cognitive functions, they must use whatever cognitive resources are 
available and easily accessible to support their abilities in regulating emotions. In this 
case, inhibition is a promising candidate because it has been found to be resistant to age-
related declines (Verhaeghen, 2011). In particular, I predicted that the relationships for 
the relatively well-preserved inhibition of negative information and PRA should increase 
with age. As predicted, across all types of PRA, older adults with higher inhibition of 
negative information showed higher levels of PRA than their counterparts with lower 
inhibition of negative information; on the other hand, younger adults with higher 
inhibition of negative information showed lower levels of PRA than their counterparts 
with lower inhibition of negative information. 
The significant interaction effect of age and inhibition of negative information on 
PRA is a robust finding in that the interaction effect was found across all three types of 
PRA. In addition, a stringent p value based on Bonferroni correction was applied to 
minimize the type I error. Thus, on a statistical level, I am confident that the interaction 
effect between age and inhibition of negative information on PRA is not a spurious 
finding.  
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The pattern in younger adults was not predicted. I suspect that younger adults 
might use a different process in positive reappraisal than older adults. When asked to 
reappraise, younger adults might rely on the negative information to generate positive 
interpretations. In other words, younger adults need to reference the negative information 
so that they can comprehend and process the negative information more thoroughly 
before finding positive meaning in a negative event (i.e., positive reappraisal). To do so, 
negative information needs to be kept active, not inhibited. Thus, for younger adults, 
better inhibition of negative information could interfere with this reappraisal process. 
This would explain why in younger adults, greater inhibition of negative information is 
related to a lower level of PRA, or younger adults with lower inhibition of negative 
information actually showed higher PRA. Findings from two recent studies seem to lend 
some support to this proposal: Isaacowitz, Toner, and Neupert (2009) found that younger 
adults with high attentional control abilities gazed toward negative information and away 
from positive information to support emotion regulation. Similarly, Noh, Lohani, and 
Isaacowitz (2011) found that younger adults experienced mood elevation when they 
directed gaze toward the most negative aspect of the stimuli. In summary, for younger 
adults to reappraise successfully, they rely on processing negative information to generate 
positive meaning. This is one potential explanation why inhibition of negative 
information is negatively associated with PRA for younger adults.  
Furthermore, I consider the possibility of attention switching as an additional 
explanation for the negative association between PRA and inhibition of negative 
information for younger adults. For younger adults who performed more poorly in 
inhibition of negative information (a short delay or no delay between trials), I propose 
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that they might actually be better at switching between trials. In this case, better 
switching ability is associated with higher PRA. This association can be explained as 
follows: A) better switching indicates better ability to disengage from irrelevant 
information from the previous trial and to direct attention to relevant information in the 
current trial, and thus B) younger adults with better switching ability are less likely to 
perseverate on irrelevant negative information and more likely to attend to relevant 
positive information during the process of reappraisal. Taken together, for younger 
adults, better switching ability might help support PRA.  
Overall, the differential pattern shown in younger and older adults suggests that 
the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA change as a function of age. This 
finding not only serves as a solid reminder that any research finding in young adults is 
not necessarily generalizable to other age groups, but also points out important and 
different mechanisms that are employed by younger and older adults to efficiently 
regulate emotions. That is, younger adults do not rely on inhibiting negative information 
to reappraise, whereas older adults do. Admittedly, this unexpected but robust finding 
will need to be warranted by future replication.  
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
Strengths. My study effectively addresses limitations in previous literature and 
advances our understanding about positive reappraisal in the following ways.  
First, this study investigates the individual differences in PRA. The investigation 
of PRA supplements our current knowledge of reappraisal, most of which has been 
understood in the construct of trait reappraisal. In this study, I demonstrate how PRA is 
conceptualized and can be validly measured via an experimental paradigm. The construct 
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of PRA is a direct and more accurate measure of an individual’s true ability to use 
positive reappraisal to up-regulate positive emotions, in contrast to an individual’s self-
claimed habitual use of reappraisal in daily life (trait reappraisal), which is difficult to 
verify.  
There are two potential future directions for this line of work. One is to include 
physiological measures along with a self-report of emotional experience. This additional 
information will provide opportunities to investigate how physiological responses change 
along with self-reported positive emotions and to better understand the constituent 
components of positive emotions. The other future direction would be to examine 
emotion reactivity as a moderator in the relationships between valence-specific EF and 
PRA. In my study, the emotion reactivity of positive emotions was included as a control 
variable for PRA, and the emotion reactivity of negative emotion (sadness) was included 
to ensure that the sad films induced moderate levels of sadness; whether the relationships 
between valence-specific EF and PRA change as a function of emotion reactivity was not 
yet examined—the emotion reactivity of negative emotions (sadness), in particular. To 
put it differently: Do people with low or high reactivity levels of sadness engage valence-
specific EF in the process of positive reappraisal differently? Regarding inhibition of 
negative information, I suspect that people with higher levels of sadness reactivity rely on 
inhibition of negative information to a greater extent than people with lower levels of 
sadness reactivity to up-regulate positive emotions. This might be because higher levels 
of sadness reactivity need to be brought under control for some positive emotions to be 
unraveled. This investigation can help us better understand the orthogonal structure of 
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positive and negative emotions and gain more insight into the role of emotion reactivity 
in the relationships between valence-specific EF and PRA. 
Second, this study is the first to examine individual differences in the ability to 
up-regulate positive emotions in a negative context. Traditionally, negative emotion has 
been the main concern in psychological research due to its close relationship to 
psychopathology or ill-being. Here, the emphasis on positive emotion and related 
cognitive processes inform the current body of knowledge in terms of promoting well-
being in stressful contexts. In addition, the presence of positive emotions has been shown 
to relate to individuals’ well-being and health outcomes (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000). 
Therefore, it is important for future studies to investigate the concurrent and predictive 
validity of PRA and see how this construct relates to overall emotional well-being in 
daily life or emotional well-being after the onset of the negative event.  
Third, the current study is different from previous studies in regard to the EF 
measures. The current study includes valence-specific EF to investigate its relationship 
with PRA, whereas previous studies employed measures of general EF (EF with neutral 
materials) to investigate its role in reappraisal (e.g., McRae et al., 2011) or other emotion 
regulation strategies (e.g., Schmeichel et al., 2008). Including valence-specific 
information in cognitive control is believed to be especially relevant to the processes in 
reappraisal (Malooly et al., 2012). Even though my study does not show significant 
associations between valence-specific EF and PRA as expected, it still provides important 
insight and questions for future studies to pursue. 
Fourth, this study includes a community sample across ages, rather than samples 
from college students only. This diverse sample provides the unique opportunity to 
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investigate the relationship between emotion regulation and EF across adulthood and to 
generalize the results to a wider population. 
Limitations. This study, admittedly, is not without limitations. First, this research 
relies on correlational data to address the relationship between valence-specific EF and 
PRA. Correlational methods do not allow us to draw causal inferences between these 
constructs. It is important for future research to manipulate valence-specific EF and see 
how it affects PRA. Nonetheless, correlational research is still an important and necessary 
first step in addressing the potential role of valence-specific EF in PRA.  
Second, the cross-sectional design in this research cannot rule out the possibility 
that age differences in PRA and in the relationships between PRA and inhibition are due 
to cohort effects. It is possible that older adults have experienced specific historical 
events or era-specific culture that has acclimated them to a specific way of regulating 
emotions. The exclusive cohort experience could also influence the way older adults 
perceive emotional stimuli presented in the study or the process involved in reappraisal. It 
is important for future research to use a longitudinal design to fully explore the 
developmental changes within individuals across adulthood. However, the cross-sectional 
design of this research is still valuable and contributes to our understanding of the 
relationship between valence-specific EF and PRA. This is because the cross-sectional 
design covers a wide age range of participants and allows the results to be generalizable 
to a wider population of adults. 
Third, although a wide age range of participants was included in the study, the 
maximum age of older adults did not exceed 72 years. It is important to include older 
adults in their 80s, 90s, and beyond, if possible, because their abilities could differ 
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dramatically from those in their 70s (cf. Shiota & Levenson, 2009). Conceivably, 
individuals’ physical and mental health may deteriorate at an increasing rate after age 80. 
These older old adults may also deal with frequent loneliness and isolation due to the loss 
of a significant other, siblings, or long-term friends. To cope with these irrevocable 
losses, the older old adults might develop a different emotional profile from the younger 
old adults. For example, they might have an overall lower level of PRA than the younger 
old adults. In addition, they might show a greater discrepancy in different types of PRA. I 
suspect that the older old adults would show higher levels of PRA regarding peace and 
calmness, but lower levels of PRA regarding optimism and hopefulness than younger old 
adults (the emphasis on peace and calmness is useful at this life stage because it helps 
cope with the awareness of impending death). 
Fourth, I measured three discrete positive emotions: happiness, love, and 
optimism. They were chosen because they are the targeted emotions in the positive 
reappraisal instruction. However, other types of positive emotions that were untested here 
might disclose other crucial components of PRA, and thus would be important to include 
in future studies. These different types of positive emotions may include, for example, 
those with a social aspect (compassion), those relating to meaning making (inspiration), 
or those describing a mental state (calmness). Including these additional types of positive 
emotions is particularly relevant while reappraising in a sad context, where a dyad 
grapples with loss of a relationship (as is the common theme in our film clips). This is 
because the reappraisal of loss may conceivably involve compassionate feelings toward 
others, inspiration being found in the process of seeking positive meaning, or a calm state 
being reached throughout the negative experience. Furthermore, having more positive 
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emotions to work with will allow for opportunities to establish the construct of positive 
emotions and to test the construct through different age groups. 
Lastly, given that this study belongs to a larger project, only one task was 
included to assess each subcomponent of EF: The negative (affective) priming task for 
inhibition of valence-specific information and the backward word span task for WM 
regarding valence-specific information. This approach imposed a significant threat to 
validity in assessing executive function in its entirety. Specifically, inhibition 
encompasses a wide variety of functions or processes, such as the negative priming 
effect, prepotent response inhibition, and inhibition of return,  (Kok, 1999; Miyake, 2001; 
Verhaeghen, 2011); several distinct brain circuits are activated in inhibition processes, 
based on various paradigms (Kok, 1999). Similarly, WM can be assessed in a variety of 
tasks: by a “dual task” (e.g., N-back or operation span) or a “simple task” (e.g., backward 
digit span task) (Yuan, Steedle, Shavelson, Alonzo, & Oppezzo, 2006). The current 
consensus on WM prefers dual tasks over simple tasks because simple tasks rely more on 
storage than on manipulating or updating information. Dual tasks, on the other hand, tap 
into the updating process, which is the essence of WM. The WM measure used in my 
study, the backward word span task, has been suggested to belong to the simple task 
category (Engle et al., 1999; Conway et al., 2005) but could also be classified as a dual 
task due to the processing of reversed word order. The content and construct validity of 
the backward word span task still need to be established.  
Therefore, to examine the role of EF in PRA, a more comprehensive approach 
that uses multiple tasks for each cognitive component would capture the “true ability” of 
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each function more accurately and better reflect the complex cognitive processes 
underlying positive reappraisal.  
Conclusion 
  This study aims to examine the relationships between valence-specific EF and 
PRA across adulthood. No association between PRA and inhibition of negative 
information or WM for positive information was found. However, the construct of PRA, 
the measures of valence-specific EF, and implications are discussed in detail. These 
discussions point to important future directions for research in reappraisal, such as the 
inclusion of a variety of valence-specific EF tasks and positive emotions. Importantly, my 
findings indicate that older adults are better at up-regulating the emotion of love than 
younger adults while engaging positive reappraisal. In addition, older adults appear to use 
inhibition of negative information to support their ability to up-regulate positive emotions 
in positive reappraisal, which is different from younger and middle-aged adults. These 
findings contribute to our knowledge of the interaction between cognitive and emotional 
aging. Potential explanations, methodological and theoretical implications, and future 
directions are discussed. 
  
 	   90 
References 
Adolphs, R., Cahill, L., Schul, R., & Babinsky, R. (1997). Impaired declarative memory 
for emotional material following bilateral amygdala damage in humans. Learning 
& Memory, 4(3), 291-300. 
Ashley, V., & Swick, D. (2009). Consequences of emotional stimuli: Age differences on 
pure and mixed blocks of the emotional stroop. Behavioral and Brain Functions, 
5, 14. doi:10.1186/1744-9081-5-14 
Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(11), 417-423. 
Baddeley, A. D. (2001). Is working memory still working? American Psychologist, 
56(11), 851-864. 
Baltes, P. B., & Baltes, M. M. (1990). Psychological perspectives on successful aging: 
The model of selective optimization with compensation. Successful aging: 
Perspectives from the behavioral sciences, 1, 1-34. 
Baumeister, R.F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K.D. (2001). Bad is stronger 
than good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323– 370. 
Beauregard, M., Levesque, J., & Bourgouin, P. (2001). Neural correlates of conscious 
self-regulation of emotion. The Journal of Neuroscience, 21(18), RC165-RC165. 
Beck, A. T., & Steer, R. A. (1984). Internal consistencies of the original and revised Beck 
Depression Inventory. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 40, 1365-1367. 
Black, D. S., Semple, R. J., Pokhrel, P., & Grenard, J. L. (2011). Component processes of 
executive function—mindfulness, self-control, and working memory—and their 
 	   91 
relationships with mental and behavioral health. Mindfulness, 2(3), 179-185. 
doi:10.1007/s12671-011-0057-2 
Blanchard-Fields, F. (2007). Everyday problem solving and emotion: An adult 
developmental perspective. Current Directions in Psychological Science (Wiley-
Blackwell), 16(1), 26-31.  
Bopp, K. L., & Verhaeghen, P. (2005). Aging and verbal memory span: A meta-analysis. 
The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 60(5), P223-P233. 
Borella, E., Carretti, B., & De Beni, R. (2008). Working memory and inhibition across 
the adult life-span. Acta Psychologica, 128(1), 33-44. 
Borella, E., Ghisletta, P., & Ribaupierre, A. d. (2011). Age differences in text processing: 
The role of working memory, inhibition, and processing speed. The Journals of 
Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 66B(3), 311-
320.  
Bryan, J., & Luszcz, M. A. (1996). Speed of information processing as a mediator 
between age and free-recall performance. Psychology and Aging, 11(1), 3-9. 
doi:10.1037/0882-7974.11.1.3 
Buchanan, T. W., & Adolphs, R. (2002). The role of the human amygdala in emotional 
modulation of long-term declarative memory. In S. C. Moore, M. Oaksford, S. C. 
Moore & M. Oaksford (Eds.), Emotional cognition: From brain to 
behaviour. (pp. 9-34). Amsterdam Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company. 
 	   92 
Butler, E. A., Egloff, B., Wlhelm, F. H., Smith, N. C., Erickson, E. A., & Gross, J. J. 
(2003). The social consequences of expressive suppression. Emotion, 3(1), 48-67.  
Cahill, L., Haier, R. J., Fallon, J., Alkire, M. T., Tang, C., Keator, D., . . . McGaugh, J. L. 
(1996). Amygdala activity at encoding correlated with long-term, free recall of 
emotional information. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 93(15), 
8016-8021. 
Cantor, J., Engle, R. W., & Hamilton, G. (1991). Short-term memory, working memory, 
and verbal abilities: How do they relate? Intelligence, 15(2), 229-246. 
Carstensen, L. L., Fung, H. H., & Charles, S. T. (2003). Socioemotional selectivity theory 
and the regulation of emotion in the second half of life. Motivation and 
Emotion, 27(2), 103-123. 
Carstensen, L. L., Isaacowitz, D. M., & Charles, S. T. (1999). Taking time seriously. 
American Psychologist, 54(3), 165-181. 
Carstensen, L. L., & Mikels, J. A. (2005). At the intersection of emotion and cognition: 
Aging and the positivity effect. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 14(3), 117-121.   
Carstensen, L. L., Mikels, J. A., & Mather, M. (2006). Aging and the intersection of 
cognition, motivation, and emotion. Handbook of the psychology of aging, 6, 343-
362. 
Carstensen, L. L., Pasupathi, M., Mayr, U., & Nesselroade, J. R. (2000). Emotional 
experience in everyday life across the adult life span. [lower frequency of 
negative emotions among older adults] Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 79(4), 644-655.   
 	   93 
Carstensen, L. L., Turan, B., Scheibe, S., Ram, N., Ersner-Hershfield, H., Samanez-
Larkin, G., Nesselroade, J. R. (2010). Emotional experience improves with age: 
Evidence based on over 10 years of experience sampling. Psychology and 
Aging, 26(1), 21-33 
Charles, S. T., Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2003). Aging and emotional memory: 
The forgettable nature of negative images for older adults. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 132(2), 310-324. 
Cohn, M. A., Fredrickson, B. L., Brown, S. L., Mikels, J. A., & Conway, A. M. (2009). 
Happiness unpacked: Positive emotions increase life satisfaction by building 
resilience. Emotion, 9(3), 361-368. doi:10.1037/a0015952 
Conway, A. R., Kane, M. J., Bunting, M. F., Hambrick, D. Z., Wilhelm, O., & Engle, R. 
W. (2005). Working memory span tasks: A methodological review and user’s 
guide. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12(5), 769-786. 
Craik, F.B. (1982): Aging and cognitive deficits: The role of attentional resources. Aging 
and Cognitive Processes, 191-211. 
Craik, F. I. M. (1986). A functional account of age differences in memory. In F. Klix, & 
H. Hagendorf, Human memory and cognitive capabilities (pp. 409-422). North-
Holland: Elsevier. 
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. (1999). Working 
memory, short-term memory, and general fluid intelligence: a latent-variable 
approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128(3), 309-331. 
 	   94 
Fisk, J. E., & Sharp, C. A. (2004). Age-related impairment in executive functioning: 
Updating, inhibition, shifting, and access. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 26(7), 874-890. doi:10.1080/13803390490510680 
Folkman, S. (1997). Positive psychological states and coping with severe stress. Social 
Science & Medicine, 45(8), 1207-1221. doi: 10.1016/S0277-9536(97)00040-3 
Folkman, S. (2008). The case for positive emotions in the stress process. Anxiety, Stress, 
& Coping, 21(1), 3-14. doi: 10.1080/10615800701740457 
Folkman, S., & Moskowitz, J. T. (2000). Positive affect and the other side of 
coping. American Psychologist, 55(6), 647-654. 
Fox, E. (1995). Negative priming from ignored distractors in visual selection: A review. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2(2), 145-173. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The 
broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56(3), 
218-226. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2003). The value of positive emotions: The emerging science of 
positive psychology is coming to understand why it's good to feel good. American 
Scientist, 330-335. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). The broaden-and-build theory of positive 
emotions. Philosophical Transactions-Royal Society of London Series B 
Biological Sciences, 1367-1378. 
Fredrickson, B. L., Tugade, M. M., Waugh, C. E., & Larkin, G. R. (2003). What good are 
positive emotions in crisis? A prospective study of resilience and emotions 
following the terrorist attacks on the united states on September 11th, 2001. 
 	   95 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(2), 365-376. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.84.2.365 
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference 
control functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 133(1), 101-135. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.133.1.101 
Goeleven, E., De Raedt, R., & Dierckx, E. (2010). The positivity effect in older adults: 
The role of affective interference and inhibition. Aging & Mental Health, 14(2), 
129-137. 
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion 
regulation: Reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological 
Psychiatry, 63(6), 577-586. 
Grieve, S., Williams, L., Paul, R., Clark, C., & Gordon, E. (2007). Cognitive aging, 
executive function, and fractional anisotropy: A diffusion tensor MR imaging 
study. American Journal of Neuroradiology, 28(2), 226-235. 
Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent-and response-focused emotion regulation: Divergent 
consequences for experience, expression, and physiology. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74(1), 224-237. 
Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. 
Psychophysiology, 39(3), 281-291.  
Gross, J. J., & Muñoz, R. F. (1995). Emotion regulation and mental health. Clinical 
Psychology: Science and Practice, 2(2), 151-164. 
 	   96 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation 
processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2), 348-362.   
Grühn, D., Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (2005). No aging bias favoring memory for positive 
material: Evidence from a heterogeneity-homogeneity list paradigm using 
emotionally toned words. Psychology and Aging, 20(4), 579-588. 
Gunning-Dixon, F. M., Gur, R. C., Perkins, A. C., Schroeder, L., Turner, T., Turetsky, B. 
I., ... & Gur, R. E. (2003). Age-related differences in brain activation during 
emotional face processing. Neurobiology of Aging. 24(2), 285-295. 
Gur, R. C., Gur, R. E., Obrist, W. D., Skolnick, B. E., & Reivich, M. (1987). Age and 
regional cerebral blood flow at rest and during cognitive activity. Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 44(7), 617-621. 
Gyurak, A., Goodkind, M. S., Madan, A., Kramer, J. H., Miller, B. L., & Levenson, R. 
W. (2009). Do tests of executive functioning predict ability to downregulate 
emotions spontaneously and when instructed to suppress? Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(2), 144-152. 
Hale, S., Rose, N. S., Myerson, J., Strube, M. J., Sommers, M., Tye-Murray, N., & 
Spehar, B. (2011). The structure of working memory abilities across the adult life 
span. Psychology and Aging, 92-110. 
Hasher, L., Stoltzfus, E. R., Zacks, R. T., & Rypma, B. (1991). Age and 
inhibition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 17(1), 163-169. 
 	   97 
Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. Working memory, comprehension, and aging: A review and a 
new view. In Psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 193-225) Academic 
Press.   
Hasher, L., Zacks, R. T., & May, C. P. (1999). Inhibitory control, circadian arousal, and 
age. Inhibitory control, circadian arousal & and age D. Gopher A. Koriat (Eds.), 
(pp. 653-675). Cambridge, MA, US: The MIT Press.  
Hofmann, S. G., Heering, S., Sawyer, A. T., & Asnaani, A. (2009). How to handle 
anxiety: The effects of reappraisal, acceptance, and suppression strategies on 
anxious arousal. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(5), 389-394.  
Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial society. Princeton University 
Press. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., & Blanchard-Fields, F. (2012). Linking process and outcome in the 
study of emotion and aging. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(1), 3-17. 
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., & Neupert, S. D. (2009). Use of gaze for real-time mood 
regulation: Effects of age and attentional functioning. Psychology and Aging, 
24(4), 989-994. 
John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2004). Healthy and unhealthy emotion regulation: Personality 
processes, individual differences, and life span development. Journal of 
Personality, 72(6), 1301-1334. 
Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria: The role of inhibitory 
processes. Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 125-147. 
 	   98 
Joormann, J. (2006). Differential effects of rumination and dysphoria on the inhibition of 
irrelevant emotional material: Evidence from a negative priming task. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 30(2), 149-160. 
Joormann, J. (2010). Cognitive inhibition and emotion regulation in depression. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 19(3), 161-166. 
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). Emotion regulation in depression: Relation to 
cognitive inhibition. Cognition and Emotion, 24(2), 281-298. 
Kane, M. J., Hasher, L., Stoltzfus, E. R., Zacks, R. T., & Connelly, S. L. (1994). 
Inhibitory attentional mechanisms and aging. Psychology and Aging, 9, 103-103. 
Kensinger, E. A., & Corkin, S. (2003). Memory enhancement for emotional words: Are 
emotional words more vividly remembered than neutral words? Memory & 
Cognition, 31(8), 1169-1180. 
King, L. A., Hicks, J. A., Krull, J. L., & Del Gaiso, A. K. (2006). Positive affect and the 
experience of meaning in life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
90(1), 179-196. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.179 
Kok, A. (1999). Varieties of inhibition: Manifestations in cognition, event-related 
potentials and aging. Acta Psychologica, 101(2–3), 129-158. doi:10.1016/S0001-
6918(99)00003-7 
Kramer, A. F., Humphrey, D. G., Larish, J. F., & Logan, G. D. (1994). Aging and 
inhibition: Beyond a unitary view of inhibitory processing in 
attention. Psychology and Aging, 9(4), 491-512. 
 	   99 
Kryla-Lighthall, N., & Mather, M. (2009). The role of cognitive control in older adults' 
emotional well-being. In Berngtson, V., Gans, D., Putney, N., & Silverstein, M. 
(Eds.) Handbook of theories in aging (2nd Ed.) (pp.323-344). Springer Publishing. 
Kunzmann, U., & Grühn, D. (2005). Age differences in emotional reactivity: The sample 
case of sadness. Psychology and Aging, 20(1), 47-59. doi:10.1037/0882-
7974.20.1.47  
Labouvie-Vief, G. (2003). Dynamic integration: Affect, cognition, and the self in 
adulthood. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(6), 201-206. 
doi:10.1046/j.0963-7214.2003.01262.x 
Labouvie-Vief, G. (2009). Cognition and equilibrium regulation in development and 
aging. Restorative Neurology & Neuroscience, 27(5), 551-565. doi:10.3233/RNN-
2009-0512 
Lang, F. R. (2001). Regulation of social relationships in later adulthood. The Journals of 
Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 56(6), P321-
P326. 
Lawton, M. P., Kleban, M. H., & Dean, J. (1993). Affect and age: cross-sectional 
comparisons of Structure and prevalence. Psychology and Aging, 8(2), 165-173. 
Levens, S. M., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). Updating positive and negative stimuli in working 
memory in depression. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139(4), 
654-664. 
Lévesque, J., Joanette, Y., Mensour, B., Beaudoin, G., Leroux, J. M., Bourgouin, P., & 
Beauregard, M. (2004). Neural basis of emotional self-regulation in 
childhood. Neuroscience, 129(2), 361-369. 
 	   100 
Lezak, M. D. (2004). Neuropsychological assessment Oxford University Press, USA. 
Linden, M., Brédart, S., & Beerten, A. (1994). Age-related differences in updating 
working memory. British Journal of Psychology, 85(1), 145-152. 
MacPherson, S. E., Phillips, L. H., & Della Sala, S. (2002). Age, executive function and 
social decision making: A dorsolateral prefrontal theory of cognitive aging. 
Psychology and Aging, 17(4), 598-609. 
Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2003). Aging and attentional biases for emotional 
faces. Psychological Science, 14(5), 409-415.   
Mather, M., & Knight, M. (2005). Goal-directed memory: The role of cognitive control 
in older adults' emotional memory. Psychology and Aging, 20(4), 554-570. 
Malooly, A. M., Genet, J. J., & Siemer, M. (2012). Individual differences in reappraisal 
effectiveness: The role of affective flexibility. Emotion, 1-12. 
doi:10.1037/a0029980 
Mauss, I. B., Cook, C. L., Cheng, J. Y. J., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Individual differences in 
cognitive reappraisal: Experiential and physiological responses to an anger 
provocation. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 66(2), 116-124. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2007.03.017 
Mayr, U., & Kliegl, R. (1993). Sequential and coordinative complexity: Age-based 
processing limitations in figural transformations. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition, 19, 1297-1297. 
McDowd, J. M. (1997). Inhibition in attention and aging. The Journals of Gerontology 
Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 52(6), 265-273. 
 	   101 
McRae, K., Ciesielski, B., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Unpacking cognitive reappraisal: Goals, 
tactics, and outcomes. Emotion, 12(2), 250-255. doi:10.1037/a0026351 
McRae, K., Hughes, B., Chopra, S., Gabrieli, J. D., Gross, J. J., & Ochsner, K. N. (2010). 
The neural bases of distraction and reappraisal. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22(2), 248-262. 
McRae, K., Jacobs, S. E., Ray, R. D., John, O. P., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Individual 
differences in reappraisal ability: Links to reappraisal frequency, well-being, and 
cognitive control. Journal of Research in Personality, 2-7. 
Mikels, J. A., Larkin, G. R., Reuter-Lorenz, P. A., & Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Divergent 
trajectories in the aging mind: Changes in working memory for affective versus 
visual information with age. Psychology and Aging, 20(4), 542-553. 
Miyake, A., & Friedman, N. P. (2012). The nature and organization of individual 
differences in executive functions four general conclusions. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 21(1), 8-14. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. 
D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions 
to complex. Cognitive Psychology, 41(1), 49-100. 
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in cognitive sciences, 7(3), 134-140. 
Mroczek, D. K., & Kolarz, C. M. (1998). The effect of age on positive and negative 
affect: A developmental perspective on happiness. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 75, 1333-1349. 
 	   102 
Murphy, N. A., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2008). Preferences for emotional information in 
older and younger adults: A meta-analysis of memory and attention 
tasks. Psychology and Aging, 23(2), 263-286.   
Myers, D. G., & Diener, E. (1995). Who is happy? Psychological Science, 6(1), 10-19. 
Neill, W.T., Valdes, L. A., & Terry , K. M. (1995). Selective attention and the inhibitory 
control of cognition. In F. N. Dempster & C. J. Brainerd (Eds.), Interference and 
inhibition in cognition (pp. 207-261). New York: Academic Press. 
Nielsen, L., Knutson, B., & Carstensen, L. L. (2008). Affect dynamics, affective 
forecasting, and aging. Emotion, 8(3), 318-330. 
Noh, S. R., Lohani, M., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2011). Deliberate real-time mood 
regulation in adulthood: The importance of age, fixation and attentional 
functioning. Cognition and Emotion, 25(6), 998-1013. 
doi:10.1080/02699931.2010.541668  
Oberauer, K., Süß, H. -., Schulze, R., Wilhelm, O., & Wittmann, W. W. (2000). Working 
memory capacity — facets of a cognitive ability construct. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 29(6), 1017-1045. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(99)00251-2 
Ochsner, K. N., Bunge, S. A., Gross, J. J., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002). Rethinking 
feelings: An fMRI study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(8), 1215-1229. 
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(5), 242-249. 
Ochsner, K. N., Ray, R. D., Cooper, J. C., Robertson, E. R., Chopra, S., Gabrieli, J. D. E., 
& Gross, J. J. (2004). For better or for worse: Neural systems supporting the 
 	   103 
cognitive down-and up-regulation of negative emotion. NeuroImage, 23(2), 483-
499. 
Öhman, A., Flykt, A., & Esteves, F. (2001). Emotion drives attention: Detecting the 
snake in the grass. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130(3), 466-
478. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.130.3.466 
Passolunghi, M. C., Vercelloni, B., & Schadee, H. (2007). The precursors of mathematics 
learning: Working memory, phonological ability and numerical competence. 
Cognitive Development, 22(2), 165-184. 
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., MacCallum, R. C., & Nicewander, W. A. (2005). Use of 
the extreme groups approach: A critical reexamination and new 
recommendations. Psychological Methods, 10, 178-192 
Richards, J. M., Butler, E. A., & Gross, J. J. (2003). Emotion regulation in romantic 
relationships: The cognitive consequences of concealing feelings. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 20(5), 599-620. 
Richards, J. M., & Gross, J. J. (2000). Emotion regulation and memory: The cognitive 
costs of keeping one's cool. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(3), 
410-424. 
Rottenberg, J., Ray, R. R., & Gross, J. J. (2007). Emotion elicitation using films. In J. A. 
Coan & J. J. B. Allen (Eds.), The handbook of emotion elicitation and assessment. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Russell, J. A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. 
Psychological Review, 110(1), 145-172. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.145 
 	   104 
Salthouse, T. A., & Babcock, R. L. (1991). Decomposing adult age differences in 
working memory. Developmental Psychology, 27(5), 763-776. 
Salthouse, T. A., & Meinz, E. J. (1995). Aging, inhibition, working memory, and 
speed. The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 50(6), 297-3-3. 
Sarason, I. G., Johnson, J. H., & Siegel, J. M. (1978). Assessing the impact of life 
changes: Development of the life experiences survey. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 46, 932-946. 
Scheibe, S., & Blanchard-Fields, F. (2009). Effects of regulating emotions on cognitive 
performance: What is costly for young adults is not so costly for older 
adults. Psychology and Aging, 24(3), 634-644. 
Scheibe, S., & Carstensen, L. L. (2010). Emotional aging: Recent findings and future 
trends. The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 65(2), 135-144. 
Scheibe, S., Mata, R., & Carstensen, L. L. (2011). Age differences in affective 
forecasting and experienced emotion surrounding the 2008 US presidential 
election. Cognition and Emotion, 25(6), 1029-1044. 
Scheibe, S., & Carstensen, L. L. (2010). Emotional aging: Recent findings and future 
trends. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social 
Sciences, 65B(2), 135-144.   
Schmeichel, B. J., Volokhov, R. N., & Demaree, H. A. (2008). Working memory 
capacity and the self-regulation of emotional expression and experience. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1526-1540.  
 	   105 
Schmeichel, B. J., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Intellectual performance and 
ego depletion: Role of the self in logical reasoning and other information 
processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(1), 33-46.  
Segal, Z.V. (1988). Appraisal of the self-schema construct in cognitive models of 
depression. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 147-162. 
Segal, D. L., Coolidge, F. L., Cahill, B. S., & O'Riley, A. A. (2008). Psychometric 
properties of the Beck Depression Inventory—II (BDI-II) among community-
dwelling older adults. Behavior Modification, 32(1), 3-20. 
Seider, B. H., Shiota, M. N., Whalen, P., & Levenson, R. W. (2011). Greater sadness 
reactivity in late life. Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience, 6(2), 186-194. 
doi:10.1093/scan/nsq069 
Shiota, M. N. (2006). Silver linings and candles in the dark: Differences among positive 
coping strategies in predicting subjective well-being. Emotion, 6(2), 335-339. 
Shiota, M. N., & Levenson, R. W. (2009). Effects of aging on experimentally instructed 
detached reappraisal, positive reappraisal, and emotional behavior 
suppression. Psychology and Aging, 24(4), 890 -900. doi:10.1037/a0017896. 
Smith, J., & Baltes, P. B. (1997). Profiles of psychological functioning in the old and 
oldest old. Psychology and Aging, 12(3), 458-472. 
Sowell, E. R., Peterson, B. S., Thompson, P. M., Welcome, S. E., Henkenius, A. L., & 
Toga, A. W. (2003). Mapping cortical change across the human life span. Nature 
Neuroscience, 6(3), 309-315. 
 	   106 
Storch, E. A., Roberti, J. W., & Roth, D. A. (2004). Factor structure, concurrent validity, 
and internal consistency of the Beck Depression Inventory—Second Edition in a 
sample of college students. Depression and Anxiety, 19(3), 187-189. 
Stuss, D. T., Alexander, M. P., Hamer, L., Palumbo, C., Dempster, R., Binns, M., . . . 
Izukawa, D. (1998). The effects of focal anterior and posterior brain lesions on 
verbal fluency. Journal-International Neuropsychological Society, 4, 265-278. 
Sullivan, M. P., & Faust, M. E. (1993). Evidence for identity inhibition during selective 
attention in old adults. Psychology and Aging, 8(4), 589-598. 
Sullivan, E. V., & Pfefferbaum, A. (2006). Diffusion tensor imaging and aging. 
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 30(6), 749-761. 
Tipper, S. P. (1985). The negative priming effect: Inhibitory priming by ignored objects. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37(4), 571-590. 
Tipper, S. P. (2001). Does negative priming reflect inhibitory mechanisms? A review and 
integration of conflicting views. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Section A, 54(2), 321-343. 
Troy, A. S., Wilhelm, F. H., Shallcross, A. J., & Mauss, I. B. (2010). Seeing the silver 
lining: Cognitive reappraisal ability moderates the relationship between stress and 
depressive symptoms. Emotion, 10(6), 783-795. doi:10.1037/a0020262 
Troyer, A. K., Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., Alexander, M. P., & Stuss, D. (1998). 
Clustering and switching on verbal fluency: The effects of focal frontal- and 
temporal-lobe lesions. Neuropsychologia, 36(6), 499-504. doi:10.1016/S0028-
3932(97)00152-8 
 	   107 
Tsai, J. L., Levenson, R. W., & Carstensen, L. L. (2000). Autonomic, subjective, and 
expressive responses to emotional films in older and younger chinese americans 
and european americans. Psychology and Aging, 15(4), 684-693. 
doi:10.1037/0882-7974.15.4.684 
Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuals use positive emotions 
to bounce back from negative emotional experiences. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 86(2), 320-333.   
Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2007). Regulation of positive emotions: Emotion 
regulation strategies that promote resilience. Journal of Happiness Studies, 8(3), 
311-333.   
Verhaeghen, P. (2011). Aging and executive control: Reports of a demise greatly 
exaggerated. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(3), 174-180. 
Warr, P. (1990). The measurement of well‐being and other aspects of mental health. 
Journal of Occupational Psychology, 63(3), 193-210. 
Wechsler, D. (1981). Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-revised. New 
York: Psychological Corporation. 
Williams, J. M. G., Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (1996). The emotional stroop task and 
psychopathology. Psychological Bulletin, 120(1), 3-24. 
Wurm, L. H., Labouvie-Vief, G., Aycock, J., Rebucal, K. A., & Koch, H. E. (2004). 
Performance in auditory and visual emotional stroop tasks: A comparison of older 
and younger adults. Psychology and Aging, 19(3), 523-535. 
Zachary, R. A., & Shipley, W. C. (1986). Shipley institute of living scale: Revised manual 
WPS. Los Angeles: Western Psychological Services. 
 	   108 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table 1. Exclusion Criteria and Final Sample  
Exclusion Criteria Excluded n N 
Did not follow reappraisal 
instruction 4  
Physically disabled 1  
Did not complete the lab session  59  
Reported no sadness during the 
baseline sad film 25  
Final Sample  250 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics 
 n M (SD) 
Agea 250 40.84 (12.37) 
Race n   %  
White or European Americans 210 84 
Black or African American 9 3.6 
American Indian or Alaska 
Native 6 2.4 
Asian Americans 5 2 
Pacific Islanders 2 .8 
Mixed 16 6.4 
Missing/ Did not specify 2 .8 
Annual Income  n % 
< $10,000 11 4.4 
$10,000-$20,000 21 8.4 
$20,000-$30,000 19 7.6 
$30,000-$40,000 25 10.0 
$40,000-$50,000 23 9.2 
$50,000-$70,000 42 16.8 
$70,000-$100,000 44 17.6 
> $100,000 31 12.4 
Missing/ Did not report 34 13.6 
Education Level Completed n % 
Partial high school or less 7 2.8 
High school graduate 10 4.0 
Partial college  85 34.0 
College graduate 104 41.6 
Graduate degree 44 17.6 
Note. Agea is noted in years.
Table 3. Sum
m
ary of Intercorrelations, M
eans, and Standard D
eviations for Em
otion Reactivity (ER) and Positive Reappraisal Ability 
(PRA) by Age G
roup 
M
easure 
M
 (SD
) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. ER
-H
appiness 
1.12(.32) 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. ER
-Love 
1.50(1.00) 
.231** 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. ER
-O
ptim
ism
 
1.55(1.05) 
.318** 
.275** 
- 
 
 
 
4. PR
A
-H
appiness 
2.18(1.68) 
.124
† 
.249** 
.151** 
- 
 
 
5. PR
A
-Love 
4.57(2.79) 
.088 
.270** 
-.009 
.403** 
- 
 
6. PR
A
-O
ptim
ism
 
4.31(2.37) 
.033 
.123 
.161* 
.494** 
.486** 
- 
N
ote. All participants, n =
231,  † p < .07, *p < = .05,  ** p < .01 (tw
o-tailed). 
M
easure 
M
 (SD
) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. ER
-H
appiness 
1.10(.30) 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. ER
-Love 
1.40(.93) 
.255* 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. ER
-O
ptim
ism
 
1.42(.92) 
.169 
.245* 
- 
 
 
 
4. PR
A
-H
appiness 
2.10(1.61) 
.071 
.182 
.092 
- 
 
 
5. PR
A
-Love 
3.96(2.73) 
.224* 
.250* 
-.135 
.476** 
- 
 
6. PR
A
-O
ptim
ism
 
3.98(2.29) 
.052 
.141 
.111 
.560** 
.326** 
- 
N
ote. Younger adults (18 to 36), n =
90,  † p < .07, *p < = .05,  ** p < .01 (tw
o-tailed). 
(continued) 
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M
easure 
M
 (SD
) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. ER
-H
appiness 
1.12(.33) 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. ER
-Love 
1.59(1.11) 
.271** 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. ER
-O
ptim
ism
 
1.44(.84) 
.459** 
.297** 
- 
 
 
 
4. PR
A
-H
appiness 
2.07(1.50) 
.236* 
.330** 
.175 
- 
 
 
5. PR
A
-Love 
4.70(2.75) 
.126 
.265** 
  .112 
.353** 
- 
 
6. PR
A
-O
ptim
ism
 
4.40(2.28) 
.112 
.077 
.243* 
.421** 
.577** 
- 
N
ote. M
iddle-aged adults (37 to 55), n =
105,  † p < .07, *p < = .05,  ** p < .01 (tw
o-tailed). 
 
 
N
ote. O
lder adults (56 to 72), n =
36,  † p < .07, *p < = .05,  ** p < .01 (tw
o-tailed). 
M
easure 
M
 (SD
) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. ER
-H
appiness 
1.14(.30) 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. ER
-Love 
1.53(.93) 
.032 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. ER
-O
ptim
ism
 
1.47(.92) 
.292 
.300 
- 
 
 
 
4. PR
A
-H
appiness 
2.06(1.61) 
-.077 
.161 
.289 
- 
 
 
5. PR
A
-Love 
4.94(2.73) 
-.353* 
.291 
-.044 
.400** 
- 
 
6. PR
A
-O
ptim
ism
 
4.17(2.29) 
-.237 
.199 
.053 
.558** 
.599** 
- 
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Table 4. Sum
m
ary of Intercorrelations, M
eans, and Standard D
eviations for Valence-Specific EF Variables: Inhibition and W
orking 
M
em
ory (W
M
) by Age G
roup 
V
ariable 
M
 
SD
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. Inhibition-N
eutral 
8.26 
29.66 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Inhibition-Positive 
7.66 
39.23 
1.58* 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. Inhibition-N
egative 
10.63 
36.94 
.07 
.05 
- 
 
 
 
4. W
M
-N
eutral 
5.55 
1.64 
-.05 
-.01 
.05 
- 
 
 
5. W
M
-Positive 
5.86 
1.41 
-.06 
.01 
-.08 
.594** 
- 
 
6. W
M
-N
egative 
5.46 
1.35 
-.03 
-.01 
-.12 
.537** 
.538** 
- 
N
ote. All participants, n =
231 * p < .05. (tw
o –tailed) ; ** p < .01. (tw
o-tailed). 
 
V
ariable 
M
 
SD
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. Inhibition-N
eutral 
12.36 
31.88 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Inhibition-Positive 
5.55 
41.22 
.342** 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. Inhibition-N
egative 
4.13 
34.48 
.047 
-.010 
- 
 
 
 
4. W
M
-N
eutral 
5.58 
1.76 
-.101 
-.063 
.110 
- 
 
 
5. W
M
-Positive 
6.00 
1.45 
-.074 
-.130 
-.094 
.586** 
- 
 
6. W
M
-N
egative 
5.39 
1.35 
-.061 
-.051 
-.106 
.623** 
.549** 
- 
N
ote. Younger adults (18 to 36), n =
89, * p < .05. (tw
o –tailed), ** p < .01. (tw
o-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
(continued) 
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 V
ariable 
  M
 
  SD
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. Inhibition-N
eutral 
2.36 
25.02 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Inhibition-Positive 
7.79 
37.37 
.023 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. Inhibition-N
egative 
17.81 
37.72 
-.001 
.123 
- 
 
 
 
4. W
M
-N
eutral 
5.59 
1.65 
-.051 
-.012 
-.164 
- 
 
 
5. W
M
-Positive 
5.83 
1.32 
-.112 
.000 
-.143 
.597** 
- 
 
6. W
M
-N
egative 
5.58 
1.27 
.007 
-.042 
-.288** 
.430** 
.498** 
- 
N
ote. M
iddle-aged adults (37 to 55), n=
 96, * p < .05. (tw
o –tailed) ; ** p <.01. (tw
o-tailed). 
 
V
ariable 
M
 
SD
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1. Inhibition-N
eutral 
16.08 
35.24 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Inhibition-Positive 
9.10 
38.87 
-.094 
- 
 
 
 
 
3. Inhibition-N
egative 
8.49 
51.34 
.472* 
.05 
- 
 
 
 
4. W
M
-N
eutral 
5.54 
1.56 
.164 
.179 
.312 
- 
 
 
5. W
M
-Positive 
5.61 
1.08 
.115 
.301 
.033 
.647** 
- 
 
6. W
M
-N
egative 
5.48 
1.34 
.055 
.373 
.077 
.698** 
.732** 
- 
N
ote. O
lder adults (56 to 72), n =
 23, * p < .05. (tw
o–tailed), ** p < .01. (tw
o-tailed). 
	  
113 
	  	   114 
Table 5.1. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Neutral 
Information (Inhibition-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .017 
  ER-Happiness .129 1.795 .074  
Step 2 
 
   .025 
  Inhibition-Neutral -.090 -1.278 .199  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .053 
  ER-Love .229 3.262 .001  
Step 2    .053 
  Inhibition-Neutral -.020 -.280 .779  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .094 
  ER-Optimism .286 4.512 .000  
Step 2    .094 
   Inhibition-Neutral -.021 -.310 .757  
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Table 5.2. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Positive 
Information (Inhibition-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .020 
  ER-Happiness .137 2.213 .028  
Step 2 
 
   .020 
  Inhibition-Positive .005 .084 .933  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .061 
  ER-Love .247 3.952 .000  
Step 2    .062 
  Inhibition-Positive .034 .541 .589  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .065 
  ER-Optimism .252 4.121 .000  
Step 2    .065 
   Inhibition-Positive -.007 -.111 .912  
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Table 5.3. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Negative 
Information (Inhibition-Negative), Controlling Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .020 
  ER-Happiness .139 2.241 .026  
Step 2 
 
   .021 
  Inhibition-Negative .033 .537 .592  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .061 
  ER-Love .244 3.924 .000  
Step 2    .062 
  Inhibition-Negative .037 .588 .557  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .065 
  ER-Optimism .252 4.122 .000  
Step 2    .065 
   Inhibition-Negative -.002 -.028 .978  
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Table 6.1. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Neutral 
Information (WM-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .087 .1372 .171  
Step 2 
 
   .013 
  WM-Neutral -.064 -1025 .306  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .232 3.758 .000  
Step 2    .080 
  WM-Neutral -.125 -2.019 .045  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .248 4.076 .000  
Step 2    .075 
   WM-Neutral -.094 -1.530 .127  
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Table 6.2. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Positive 
Information (WM-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .088 1.388 .166  
Step 2 
 
   .009 
  WM-Positive -.015 -.240 .810  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .240 3.905 .000  
Step 2    .074 
  WM-Positive -.100 -1.602 .107  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .253 4.156 .000  
Step 2    .069 
   WM-Positive .050 .819 .414  
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Table 6.3. Linear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Negative 
Information (WM-Negative), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .091 1.433 .153  
Step 2 
 
   .011 
  WM-Negative .050 .784 .434  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .241 3.889 .000  
Step 2    .067 
  WM-Negative -.060 -.969 .334  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .252 4.142 .000  
Step 2    .072 
   WM-Negative .079 1.297 .196  
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Table 7.1. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Neutral 
Information (Inhibition-Neutral) and Inhibition of Neutral Information Squared 
(Inhibition-Neutral2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .017 
  ER-Happiness .120 1.663 .104  
Step 2 
 
   .025 
  Inhibition-Neutral -.093 -1.324 .187  
Step 3    .027 
  Inhibition-Neutral2 .021 .571 .569  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .053 
  ER-Love .233 3.341 .001  
Step 2    .053 
  Inhibition-Neutral -.008 -.112 .911  
Step 3    .060 
 Inhibition-Neutral2 -.046 -1.215 .226  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .094 
  ER-Optimism .294 4.565 .000  
Step 2    .094 
Inhibition-Neutral -.025 -.366 .714  
Step 3    .096 
 Inhibition-Neutral2 -.030 -.733 .464  
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Table 7.2. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Positive 
Information (Inhibition-Positive) and Inhibition of Positive Information Squared 
(Inhibition-Positive2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .020 
  ER-Happiness .141 2.272 .024  
Step 2 
 
   .020 
  Inhibition-Positive -.006 -.095 .925  
Step 3    .024 
  Inhibition-Positive2 .039 .960 .338  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .061 
  ER-Love .247 3.949 .000  
Step 2    .062 
  Inhibition-Positive .031 .489 .625  
Step 3    .062 
  Inhibition-Positive2 .009 .215 .830  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .065 
  ER-Optimism .251 4.091 .000  
Step 2    .065 
Inhibition-Positive -.011 -.182 .856  
Step 3    .066 
 Inhibition-Positive2 .017 .416 .678  
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Table 7.3. Curvilinear Regression Analyses:Predicting PRA by Inhibition of Negative 
Information (Inhibition-Negative) and Inhibition of Negative Information Squared 
(Inhibition-Negative2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .020 
  ER-Happiness .140 2.252 .025  
Step 2 
 
   .021 
  Inhibition-Negative .038 .598 .550  
Step 3    .022 
  Inhibition-Negative2 .016 .409 .683  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .061 
  ER-Love .244 3.903 .000  
Step 2    .062 
  Inhibition-Negative .041 .637 .525  
Step 3    .063 
  Inhibition-Negative2 .018 .442 .659  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .065 
  ER-Optimism .252 4.135 .000  
Step 2    .065 
 Inhibition-Negative .005 .086 .931  
Step 3    .067 
 Inhibition-Negative2 .026 .442 .500  
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Table 8.1. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Neutral 
Information (WM-Neutral) and WM for Neutral Information Squared (WM-Neutral2), 
Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .085 .1341 .181  
Step 2 
 
   .013 
  WM-Neutral -.055 .859 .391  
Step 3    .015 
  WM-Neutral2 -.032 -.734 .464  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .233 3.749 .000  
Step 2    .080 
  WM-Neutral -.128 -2.013 .045  
Step 3    .080 
 WM-Neutral2 .009 .211 .833  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .247 4.044 .000  
Step 2    .075 
   WM-Neutral -.093 -1.474 .142  
Step 3    .075 
 WM-Neutral2 -.003 -.005 .940  
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Table 8.2. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Positive 
Information (WM-Positive) and WM for Positive Information Squared (WM-
Positive2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER) 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .089 1.395 .164  
Step 2 
 
   .009 
  WM-Positive -.016 -.259 .796  
Step 3    .009 
 WM-Positive2 .010 .270 .788  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .241 3.921 .000  
Step 2    .074 
  WM-Positive -.093 -1.501 .135  
Step 3    .080 
  WM-Positive2 -.045 -1.224 .222  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .249 4.056 .000  
Step 2    .069 
  WM-Positive .053 .852 .395  
Step 3    .071 
  WM-Positive2 -.027 -.741 .459  
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Table 8.3. Curvilinear Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by WM for Negative 
Information (WM-Negative) and WM for Negative Information Squared (WM-
Negative2), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .090 1.412 .159  
Step 2 
 
   .011 
  WM-Negative .049 .746 .456  
Step 3    .011 
  WM-Negative2 -005 -.098 .922  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .241 3.880 .000  
Step 2    .067 
  WM-Negative -.059 -.925 .356  
Step 3    .067 
 WM-Negative2 .004 .089 .929  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .252 4.099 .000  
Step 2    .072 
  WM-Negative .074 1.180 .239  
Step 3    .073 
  WM-Negative2 -.017 -.375 .708  
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Table 9.1. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and Inhibition of Neutral 
Information (Inhibition-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .005 
  ER-Happiness .075 1.063 .289  
Step 2    .016 
  Age -.003 -.042 .967  
  Inhibition-Neutral -.104 -1.461 .145  
Step 3 
 
   .016 
 Age* Inhibition-Neutral 
NeutNeutralNEUTRAL 
-.023 -.327 .744  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .050 
   ER-Love .207 3.006 .003  Step 2    .080 
  Age .171 2.267 .024  
  Inhibition-Neutral .005 .064 .949  
Step 3    .089 
  Age* Inhibition-Neutral .099 1.406 .161  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .094 
  ER-Optimism .282 4.417 .000  
Step 2    .094 
  Age .025 .341 .733  
  Inhibition-Neutral -.022 -.310 .757  
Step 3    .096 
 Age* Inhibition-Neutral -.044 -.641 .522  
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Table 9.2. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and Inhibition of Positive 
Information (Inhibition-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .089 1.432 .153  
Step 2    .009 
  Age -.022 -.345 .730  
  Inhibition-Positive .002 .026 .994  
Step 3 
 
   .009 
  Age* Inhibition-Positive -.011 -.173 .863  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .059 
  ER-Love .234 3.737 .000  
Step 2    .081 
  Age .143 2.306 .022  
  Inhibition-Positive .033 .527 .599  
Step 3    .083 
  Age* Inhibition-Positive .043 .680 .497  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .065 
  ER-Optimism .249 4.062 .000  
Step 2    .066 
  Age .006 .095 .925  
  Inhibition-Positive -.002 -.027 .978  
Step 3    .070 
  Age* Inhibition-Positive .067 1.083 .280  
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Table 9.3 Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and Inhibition of Negative 
Information (Inhibition-Negative), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .088 1.434 .153  
Step 2    .010 
  Age -.013 -.216 .829  
  Inhibition-Negative -.002 -.029 .977  
Step 3 
 
   .039 
  Age* Inhibition-Negative 
NegatveNegatNegative 
.168 2.677 .008  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .059 
  ER-Love .214 3.503 .001  
Step 2    .081 
  Age .150 2.463 .014  
  Inhibition-Negative -.004 -.064 .949  
Step 2    .114 
  Age* Inhibition-Negative .182 2.940 .004  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .065 
  ER-Optimism .258 4.273 .000  
Step 2    .065 
  Age .015 .250 .803  
  Inhibition-Negative -.036 -.577 .565  
Step 2    .098 
  Age* Inhibition-Negative .181 2.941 .004  
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Table 10.1. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and WM for Neutral 
Information (WM-Neutral), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .087 1.372 .171  
Step 2    .013 
  Age -.020 -.331 .756  
  WM-Neutral -.064 -1.022 .317  
Step 3 
 
   .014 
  Age* WM-Neutral .022 -.328 .744  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .221 3.601 .000  
Step 2    .106 
  Age .164 2.633 .009  
 WM-Neutral -.108 -1.738 .084  
Step 3    .106 
  Age* WM-Neutral .019 .294 .769  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .247 4.069 .000  
Step 2    .075 
  Age .018 .286 .775  
 WM-Neutral -.083 1.337 .182  
Step 3    .084 
  Age* WM-Neutral .102 1.529 .128  
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Table 10.2. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and WM for Positive 
Information (WM-Positive), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .088 1.385 .167  
Step 2    .009 
  Age -.024 -.364 .719  
  WM-Positive -.025 -.387 .699  
Step 3 
 
   .010 
  Age*WM-Positive -.039 -.594 .533  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .229 3.743 .000  
Step 2    .099 
  Age .161 2.560 .011  
  WM-Positive -.072 -1.140 .255  
Step 3    .099 
  Age*WM-Positive .013 .205 .838  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .253 4.134 .000  
Step 2    .069 
  Age .030 .472 .673  
  WM-Positive .065 1.108 .310  
Step 3    .073 
  Age*WM-Positive .061 .951 .343  
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Table 10.3. Regression Analyses: Predicting PRA by Age and WM for Negative 
Information (WM-Negative), Controlling for Emotion Reactivity (ER). 
 PRA-Happiness  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .008 
  ER-Happiness .091 1.432 .154  
Step 2    .011 
  Age -.014 -.224 .823  
  WM-Negative .049 .765 .445  
Step 3 
 
   .011 
  Age*WM-Negative -.015 -.232 .817  
 PRA-Love  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .063 
  ER-Love .227 3.743 .000  
Step 2    .097 
  Age .174 2.795 .006  
  WM-Negative -.052 -.842 .401  
Step 3    .098 
  Age*WM-Negative .038 .613 .540  
 PRA-Optimism  
Predictor B t p R2 
Step 1    .066 
  ER-Optimism .249 4.070 .000  
Step 2    .073 
  Age .020 .329 .742  
  WM-Negative .081 1.328 .185  
Step 3    .074 
  Age*WM-Negative .039 .628 .531  
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Dual-processing Model. Inhibition of negative information and working 
memory for positive information contribute to Positive reappraisal ability (PRA). 
Inhibition of Negative 
Information 
Working Memory for 
Positive Information 
Positive Reappraisal Ability 
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Figure 2. Schematic presentation of experimental procedure.  
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Figure 3a. Negative Priming Task. A prime trial and a test trial are presented. 
Participants are asked to attend to the blue word (target) and ignore the red word 
(distractor). The time interval between participants’ response and the presentation of 
the next trial is called the Response Stimulus Interval (RSI).  
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Figure 3b. Negative Affective Priming Task. A prime trial and a test trial are 
presented. Participants are asked to attend to the blue word (target) and ignore the red 
word (distractor). The time interval between participants’ response and the 
presentation of the next trial is called the Response Stimulus Interval (RSI). Adpated 
from Joormann, J. (2004). Attentional bias in dysphoria. The role of inhibitory 
processes. Cognition and Emotion, 18(1), 125-147. 
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Figure 4. Positive emotion ratings across films and groups. Positive emotion ratings 
differ between conditions (baseline vs. reappraisal). Y-axis represents discrete 
positive emotions. * p < .05. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 5a. The interaction of Inhibition-Negative and age on PRA-Happiness. Y-axis 
represents the PRA-Happiness in z-units. X-axis represents three levels (low, 
medium, high) of inhibition of negative information. Values depict estimates at 
+1SD, mean, and -1SD for age and inhibition of negative information. Error bars 
represent one standard error of the mean. * p < .05, † p < .08.   
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Figure 5b. The interaction of Inhibition-Negative and age on PRA-Love. Y-axis 
represents the PRA-Love in z-units. X-axis represents three levels (low, medium, 
high) of inhibition of negative information. Values depict estimates at +1SD, mean, 
and -1SD for age and inhibition of negative information. Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. * p < .05, † p < .08. 
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Figure 5c. The interaction of Inhibition-Negative and age on PRA-Optimism. Y-axis 
represents the PRA-Optimism in z-units. X-axis represents three levels (low, medium, 
high) of inhibition of negative information. Values depict estimates at +1SD, mean, 
and -1SD for age and inhibition of negative information. Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. * p < .05, † p < .08.  
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Appendix C 
 
Reappraisal Instructions: 
Please watch the following film clip carefully. This time, as you watch, try to think 
about the situation you see in a more positive light. You can achieve this in several 
different ways. For example, try to imagine advice that you could give to the 
characters in the film clip to make them feel better. This could be advice that would 
help them think about the positive bearing this event could have on their lives. Or, 
think about the good things they might learn from this experience. Keep in mind that 
even though a situation may be painful in the moment, in the long run, it could make 
one’s life better, or have unexpected good outcomes. In other words, try to think 
about the situation in as positive terms as you possibly can. This can be difficult at 
times, so it is very important that you try your best. Please ask the research assistant if 
you have questions about this task. It is very important that you carefully watch the 
film clip, but think about it from a positive perspective.  
 
	  
